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ABSTRACT 
This study researched a project to set up a national television 
service for Botswana to find out whether the service could be used for 
rural development generally, and in particular to assist the Ministry of 
Health to implement its health projects in the rural areas and 
including the fight against the AIDS disease. It reviews conceptions of 
development and also analyses various communication models that 
usefully inform the conceptualisation of a TV service that can 
contribute to development. 
The study was done by going through reports of feasibility 
studies on the project and through letters of official correspondence 
among officials of the Government of Botswana who debated the 
subject of whether or not the country should have a national TV 
service . 
The reports and correspondence were supplemented with 
interviews of key people involved in the implementation of the project , 
as well as interviews of officials of the Ministry of Health . 
The findings of the study are that the Botswana television 
service project started and ended on a footing that forgot about 
television , a medium that is dependent on professional and 
organ isational capacity and purpose, and as a result the project did 
not take-off. 
A qualitative method was used as the study required in-depth 
interviews during which new issues kept on emerging and nothing 
could be pre-determined because the study took place as the project 
was being implemented. 
The study was completed in June 2000, at a point where the 
project should have been completed but it was discovered that the 
station could not go on air as a television service had not been 
conceptualised and there was no management structure in place and 
the Government of Botswana appealed to the British Government for 
the staff of the British Broadcasting Corporation to come quickly to 
Botswana to rescue the project and put it on track, supposed ly 
The study has concluded that the Botswana television service 
project became stillborn because there was a lack of professional and 
intellectual capacity to conceptualise the service, and instead there 
had been too much concentration on the construction of the TV 
building and acquisition of equipment. 
ABSTRACT 
This study researched a project to set up a national television 
service for Botswana to find out whether the service could be used for 
rural development generally, and in particular to assist the Ministry of 
Health to implement its health projects in the rural areas and 
including the fight against the AIDS disease. It reviews conceptions of 
development and also analyses various communication models that 
usefully inform the conceptualisation of a TV service that can 
contribute to development. 
The study was done by going through reports of feas ibility 
studies on the project and through letters of official correspondence 
among officials of the Government of Botswana who debated the 
subject of whether or not the country should have a national TV 
service. 
The reports and correspondence were supplemented with 
interviews of key people involved in the implementation of the project , 
as well as interviews of officials of the Ministry of Health . 
The findings of the study are that the Botswana television 
service project started and ended on a footing that forgot about 
television, a medium that is dependent on professional and 
organisational capacity and purpose, and as a result the project did 
not take-off. 
A qualitative method was used as the study required in-depth 
interviews during which new issues kept on emerging and nothing 
cou ld be pre-determined because the study took place as the project 
was being implemented. 
The study was completed in June 2000, at a point where the 
project should have been completed but it was discovered that the 
station could not go on air as a television service had not been 
conceptualised and there was no management structure in place and 
the Government of Botswana appealed to the British Government for 
the staff of the British Broadcasting Corporation to come qu ickly to 
Botswana to rescue the project and put it on track, supposedly. 
The study has concluded that the Botswana television service 
project became stillborn because there was a lack of profeSSional and 
intellectual capacity to conceptualise the service, and instead there 
had been too much concentration on the construction of the TV 
bu ilding and acquisition of equipment. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my gratitude to the director of the 
Department of Information and Broadcasting Ted Makgekgenene 
who without hesitation made available to me official correspondence 
about Botswana television ; to the co-ordinator of the television project 
Kevin Hunt for granting me interviews, even on the eve of his 
departure for the UK after he had been dismissed from the project; to 
the Chief Broadcasting Engineer Habuji Sosome for explain ing 
complicated digital TV broadcast technologies to me; and to the staff 
of the department for their moral support, particularly myoid friend 
Moreri Gabakgore; to the Office of the President for granting me a 
permit to do the research ; to officials of the Ministry of Health, 
especially Winnie Manyeneng for the interviews they granted me; and 
to my thesis supervisor and Head of the Department of Journalism 
and Media Studies Professor Guy Berger for challenging some of my 
assumptions and for the many lively debates we had together on 
media and development; the staff of his office and all his academic 
colleagues in the department for their support and encouragement. 
Many thanks go to my Canadian friend John Clement of 
Dipolelo Video Arts in Botswana who made a lot of input when we 
discussed some of the problems and opportunities of training people 
for a television service in a country such as Botswana; to my 
col leagues in the MA programme at Rhodes University, namely 
Francis Chikunkhuzeni of Malawi and Angie Lazaro of South Africa 
who were great sources of inspiration to me; to the library staff of 
Rhodes University especially Babalwa Sishuta for guiding me to 
useful databases of the library. 
I would also like to thank the Executive Chairman of the 
Botswana Telecommunications Authority (BTA) C.M. Lekaukau for 
granting me a study leave from my duties at the BTA to finish this 
thesis, and to his staff for cheering me up whenever I visited the 
office, and thus boosting my spirits! 
Last but not least, lots of thanks to all my beautiful children for 
accepting that I should go for further studies after retiring from the 
Botswana civil service! 
PREFACE 
This study was carried out in Botswana and it is about the 
establishment of the country's national television service which was 
originally scheduled to go on air at the end of 1999 but due to 
implementation problems was delayed until the year 2000. 
The aim of the research was to find out whether the TV service 
could be used for rural development, particularly for the battle against 
the AIDS disease. 
Chapter 1 discusses the methodology of the research. As the 
research was on a TV station that did not exist but a project to set it up 
was being implemented, qualitative research became the most 
appropriate research method. This was so because the process of 
research involved in-depth interviews, description, analyses and 
interpretation of the collected data. The chapter also discusses 
problems that were encountered during the research, most of which 
were logistical in nature and arose mainly from the fact I was a fulltime 
student in South Africa but my research site was in Botswana and a lot 
of time was consumed by frequent travelling between the two 
countries. 
The conclusion reached in this chapter is that the Office of the 
President in Botswana interfered with the research because toward the 
end of my research they refused me access to documents that could 
have assisted me in the evaluation of the TV project. 
Chapter 2 gives a brief background to the broadcasting media in 
Botswana and attempts to explain why the country did not start a 
national television service at independence in 1966 until 1997 when 
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the decision to start it was made. The chapter also discusses the 
report of the International Telecommunication Union, which was 
possibly the first public evidence to show that debates were going in 
government circles about a television service for the country. Reports 
of subsequent consultancies are also discussed. 
The conclusion reached in this chapter is that there was a lack of 
eloquence and clarity during the debates within the top echelons of the 
civil service to explain why Botswana should or should not have a 
television service and this continued for almost a decade, 1989 to 
1997, the year in which the government took a decision for the 
establishment of the service. Perhaps it was this lack of clarity that led 
to the government taking this decision without explaining what the 
television service was needed for. 
Chapter 3 discusses development theories and their impact on 
the countries of the Third World, particularly Africa, as well as the role 
of the media, if any, in the various theories and models. 
The conclusion reached is that development is a problematic 
term and to be utilised meaningfully one should always explain its 
meaning in the context of the discussion. Another observation is that 
most of the development theories and models discussed have not 
worked in Africa, including Botswana, and that for any of the models to 
deliver the desired outcomes an appropriate social policy must first be 
carved and used as an instrument of intervention. 
Chapter 4 focuses on media and development with the aim of 
searching for a communication model that is appropriate for Botswana 
television if it were to be used for development purposes, particularly 
for rural development. The chapter also discusses indigenous forms of 
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communication like oramedia, as well as conventional media theories 
like the "Uses and Gratification" theory. The role and importance of the 
Intemet as a new communication force is also highlighted. 
The conclusion reached is that many of the theories of 
communication have aged somewhat following the arrival of new 
communication technologies, particularly the Internet and broadcast 
satellites, and therefore should be discussed with great caution 
because their traditional impact on the audience has now been 
undermined by these technologies. 
Chapter 5 discusses development in Botswana and the plans of 
the Ministry of Health. It gives a brief profile of Botswana and a short 
background of development since the country attained independence. 
It touches on the institutions of government, style of development, the 
model of development and AIDS, the new threat to the development of 
the country. 
The chapter also discusses the government's new emphasis on 
human development. 
The conclusion reached is that the Ministry of Health has an 
opportunity to use the new television service but it is likely to lose this 
opportunity because apparently it did not see it as such and therefore 
did not prepare for it. 
Chapter 6 deals with the plans of Botswana television service as 
they were rolled out. It examines and discusses the content of letters 
that the management of the Department of Information and 
Broadcasting wrote to the Office of the President which is responsible 
for the media and some ministries seeking guidance on how they 
should implement the TV project. The scenario that was eventually 
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chosen and the co-ordinator who was recruited from the UK to 
implement the project are also discussed. 
The conclusion reached is that a careful study of the written 
communication between the co-ordinator and the director of the 
department reveals that the co-ordinator persuaded the director to 
change the scope of the project and make it bigger, and when this 
happened none of the two understood the financial and manpower 
implications of the change in scope, and as a result the project went 
out of control and ran away with both of them. 
Chapter 7 contains an assessment of the TV project and 
identifies the main reason why the government of Botswana 
postponed the starting of a television service for 31 years. The 
chapter also discusses an unforeseen development in the project 
implementation programme which was the dismissal of the project co-
ordinator from his job. 
The conclusion reached is that it is difficult to diagnose the real 
cause of the mismanagement of the project but it would appear that 
those who implemented it started and finished it on a footing that 
forgot all about television. 
Chapter 8 is the conclusion of the thesis. The conclusion is that 
Botswana has missed an opportunity to have a television service that 
could be used to contribute to rural development. This has happened 
because there was a serious lack of professional and intellectual 
capacity to conceptualise the television service. There was too much 
concentration on the building and equipment and very little if any on 
the service itself. 
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CHAPTER 1 
METHODOLOGY 
The methodology that has been used for this thesis was dictated 
by the nature of the data that I wanted to get. Because the research 
was on a project that was not yet in existence but was in the process 
of being implemented, in order to know how the project had been 
conceptualised and what had been said about it before implementation 
began, I had to access reports of feasibility studies on the project, 
letters of correspondence among officials of the Government of 
Botswana who were involved in the project and interview some of 
them. Although the documents were an important source, one could 
not avoid being sensitive to the context in which they were written, the 
possible agendas and the audiences they were intended for. I also had 
to interview the project co-ordinator who had been recruited from the 
UK for the purpose. I concluded that the best method for extracting 
data from these sources would be the qualitative research approach, 
using in-depth interviews, and describing, analysing and interpreting 
documentation. 
Although this was the chosen approach, one had to bear in mind 
that while it has its own strengths, it also has its own weaknesses. One 
of its strengths is its commitment to viewing events, actions, norms 
and values from the perspective of the people who are being studied 
(Alan Bryman, 1988) . This approach gives some insight into human 
agency. But ideally, it needs to be complemented with more objective 
data to lessen its subjectivity, because as Silverman warns (1983:27) , 
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data from a qualitative enquiry can still be manipulated even if it is 
generated from participants in their natural setting. 
One of the weaknesses is that it can ignore the issue of the 
researcher's own perspective which can in turn affect how the 
perspective of the people is gathered and interpreted. 
At a glance, interviewing can appear to be an easy task, but in 
practice it is a difficult one. This is so because it does not matter how 
carefully one crafts the wording of the questions, whether they are 
written or spoken, there is nearly always an element of ambiguity. 
In the process of using interviewing in this research I was not 
unmindful of the fact that feminist studies have problematized 
interviewing by introducing the gender factor into it, and arguing that 
the gender of the interviewer does come into play and does influence 
the outcome of any interview (Gluck and Patai, 1991), and so does the 
issue of race (Stanfield, 1985). Another point that one had to keep in 
mind is the suggestion that interviewing is a masculine paradigm and 
embedded in a masculine culture (Oakley, 1981). 
One also had to bear in mind that although interviewing can help 
establish rapport with the respondents, it could also create problems in 
situations where the researcher 'goes native', becoming a member 
and spokesperson of the group and in the process losing the academic 
role. 
While one had to keep all these arguments and suggestions in 
focus, one had to attach a lot of importance to the consensus that has 
emerged between the schools of thoughts on types of research and 
interviews which can be grouped under the categories of qualitative 
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and quantitative research, a consensus that says different types of 
interviewing are suited to different situations. 
A quantitative approach could also have been used together with 
the qualitative one if this was deemed advisable. However it was not 
brought in because it not did not appear to be more appropriate at any 
point in the research. This was so mainly because the TV project was 
still being implemented and therefore unfolding, and no one was 
certain what was going to happen next. One could not freeze this 
process and study it using a quantitative approach. 
Other formats of interviewing were not used either, like 
structured, semi-structured and group interviews. The reason was that 
in a structured interview for example, I would have to ask each 
respondent a series of pre-established questions with a limited set of 
response-categories, and would have to treat every interview in the 
same manner. It would have been difficult to catch up with the project 
as it continued to rollout. Similarly, a group interview, which could be 
done in different formats would not have been appropriate either 
because it would mean grouping together a number of top government 
executives who were involved in the TV project and asking them 
questions simultaneously in a formal or informal setting. One is aware 
here that this type of interviewing could be a useful tool that could 
provide another level of data gathering that would not be available 
through individual interviews of government officials. If it had been 
possible it would also have been less expensive and perhaps also 
stimulating to respondents as they interacted amongst themselves. 
One disadvantage could be that the group could be dominated by one 
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or two persons. Besides, this type of interviewing is not appropriate for 
researching sensitive topics, and the TV project was quite sensitive. 
In summary, so far there is not what one can call a perfect type 
of interviewing. Each type entails assumptions in the questions asked 
and throughout the interview the researcher has to try to be clear 
about what her or she means. 
The author has tried to take all the precautions mentioned above 
to minimise the weaknesses of interviewing as an instrument of data 
collection, without necessarily trying to pit one type of interviewing 
against another, because as Oenzin and Lincoln have observed 
(1994:373): 
Many scholars are now realizing that to pit one type of 
interviewing against another is a futile effort, a leftover from the 
paradigmatic quantitative/qualitative hostility of past generations. 
Context of the research 
The interest in doing this research arose from the fact that the 
Botswana government was shortly to introduce a national television 
service. The only electronic public medium was the radio and it was 
run as a government department. The aim of the study was to assess 
how useful the new TV medium was going to be to the majority of the 
people who live in the rural areas. The TV project was expected by 
government to assist its ministries that are crucial to the delivery of 
services in the rural areas, the ministries of health, agriculture and 
education. There were and still are debates about the use of media for 
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development. I wanted to see how these related to the Botswana 
television service. There are also debates about the definition and 
meaning of development and I wanted to look at how all these related 
to the official version of development in Botswana and what the role of 
television could be. 
It was also my expectation that the study could contribute to 
knowledge on how some developing countries, particularly those in the 
region of southern Africa, could use television for rural development, 
should they so wish, after learning from the success or failure of the 
Botswana project because of the manner in which it was 
conceptualised. 
It was also my intention to publish the study so that it could help 
students of the department of Journalism, Media Studies and Public 
Communication of the University of Botswana with their research work 
into the beginnings of a national television service in Botswana. 
Problems encountered 
One of the problems I faced in this research project was that of 
logistics, the fact that I attended Rhodes University in South Africa as 
a fulltime student while my research site was in Botswana. It was 
difficult to access material, which was mainly letters in government 
confidential files and reports of feasibility studies on the TV project. I 
had to travel to Botswana four times to do research on site. 
Secondly, before I could be allowed to have access to any of the 
documents I had to apply to the Office of the President for a research 
permit. This is a requirement particularly if the researcher wants to use 
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information in government files. The process was too long and slow, 
and it took some three months before I got the permit. I had to wait for 
it in South Africa so that I could budget the research time properly. 
Thirdly, South African universities had very little literature on the 
use of television for rural development, and the few books that were 
available were in the University of South Africa in Pretoria. But with the 
help of librarians at Rhodes University I managed to borrow those 
books, but again it was a very slow and costly process, and I could 
borrow them only for a limited time. 
After doing the literature review I had to travel to Botswana so 
that I could be closer to the project, to the people who were 
implementing it, and to government files on the project. 
The assumption that I had had all the time from the pOint when I 
decided on the Botswana TV project as my research topic up to the 
point where I thought the project was nearing completion was that the 
TV service, no matter how poorly conceptualised it might have been, 
would take off and actually go on air in 1999 as scheduled. But it did 
not. The commissioning date of the project kept on receding and 
moving further and further into the distance. It was postponed at least 
three times, almost delayed by a whole year. And just four months 
before it was due to go on air it got paralysed and could not take-off. In 
response the Government of Botswana appealed to Britain, to the 
British Broadcasting Corporation to quickly dispatch a team of BBC 
staff to Botswana to rescue the project and put it on track. 
This had the effect of throwing my research out of balance 
because for some weeks I could not make sense of what was 
happening, as government officials who were involved in the project 
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did not want to explain anything. In the circumstances I decided to wait 
for the BBC team so I could make its arrival in Botswana and the terms 
of reference that they were given the cut-off point for my research. 
Therefore the last two chapters of the thesis are an entirely new 
development, as I had to deal with the aftermath of the crash of the 
project. In other words those last chapters are a post-mortem of the TV 
project, the television service that never was. 
The problem here was that, as things turned out, I was 
researching a turbulent project where new situations kept on 
emerging, to the surprise of both the implementation team and the 
Government of Botswana. I was not awake to the possibility that the 
TV service project may not materialise, even though I had spent 
almost two years trying to get the expected programme content of the 
station, its budget, management structure, running costs and training 
plans, without success. 
I was not allowed the opportunity to study the report of the 
auditors that had been engaged by the government to probe what it 
called the mismanagement and misappropriation of the finances of the 
project because the permanent secretary in the Office of the President 
who was responsible for administration, Samuel Rathedi, would not let 
me have the report, saying that it was confidential, even though it was 
the same office that had given me a research permit to do my thesis 
on the project. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
Introduction 
This chapter gives a brief background and context to the 
broadcasting media in Botswana and also attempts to explain why the 
country did not start a national television service at independence in 
1966 until in the year 2 000, assuming that it will go on air this year. 
The chapter also discusses the report of the International 
Telecommunication Union, which was possibly the first public 
evidence that debates were going on in government circles on 
whether or not Botswana should start its own national television 
service. Reports of subsequent consultancies on the TV debates are 
also discussed, including the Croton Report and The Studio Hamburg 
Report, as well as an attempt by a South African private company, 
M-NET, to start a national pay-TV service for Botswana in partnership 
with the government. 
Broadcasting Media Context 
At present Botswana has no Information Act and no 
broadcasting policy. There is a draft broadcasting policy document, 
which was submitted to the Office of the President in July 1999 by a 
firm of broadcasting consultants in South Africa who had been 
engaged to draft it. There is a Broadcasting Act which was enacted in 
August 1998. 
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From independence in 1966, until May 1999, there was only one 
radio station, Radio Botswana, which broadcast on two channels, the 
general and the commercial service. The station is the broadcasting 
component of the government department of Information and 
Broadcasting which falls directly under the Office of the President. 
The change in the broadcasting media situation happened in 
May 1999 when the country's first ever private commercial radio 
station, cal led YA RONA FM, was licensed. A second private 
commercial radio station, GABZ FM, was licensed in September 1999. 
The Botswana Telecommunications Authority licensed the two. The 
Authority has since handed over the responsibility of issuing 
broadcasting licences to a new organisation, the National 
Broadcasting Board, which has been set up under the Broadcasting 
Act of 1998 to issue broadcasting licences and to "exercise control 
over and to supervise broadcasting activities" (Broadcasting Act 1998, 
p. A.30) 
Because the country had no Broadcasting Act or Policy for 32 
years, the only guidelines that the managers of the Department of 
Information and Broadcasting followed all along were the contents of a 
report entitled "Report on the Information Functions of Government, 
Gaborone, March 1968". A certain A.J.Hughes who had been 
engaged by the government submitted it to the Government of 
Botswana. According to the terms of reference, Hughes had been 
assigned 
To make a comprehensive summary of the present information 
functions within Government, including all Ministries and media; 
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to assess the impact that the information functions are making 
on the people and to make recommendations for the 
improvement, expansion and future orientation of information 
work, bearing in mind the need to make the most economical 
use of available resources (1968, p. 4). 
About Radio Botswana specifically, Hughes said the rapid build 
up of the technical facilities and output of Radio Botswana over the 
previous few years had been a notable achievement, and then said 
"there is now a need to re-assess the role of radio and to give 
broadcasting a clear policy" (1968, p.29). He stated that radio was the 
most efficient means of communication for reaching the citizens of 
Botswana, and spelt out the role of Radio Botswana: 
Radio Botswana is not a public service corporation like the BBG. 
It is a Government department and its job is to assist all other 
Ministries and departments in the execution of their various 
functions. Under no circumstances should it be used to 
embarrass, frustrate or oppose the Government of which it is 
part (1968, p.30). 
About television in the newly independent Botswana Hughes 
said there was understandably considerable interest in its prospects, 
but from the information standpoint there would be little pOint in 
introducing it. He justified his decision by saying that most places in 
Botswana did not have electricity and transistorised radio receivers 
were not fully developed yet. He said the cost would be out of reach of 
all but a tiny handful of Batswana and transmission costs were not 
likely to be recouped in licence fees and advertising revenues, and he 
concluded: "I therefore advise against the introduction of television in 
Botswana" (1968, p.39). 
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The decision 
On March 26 1997 the cabinet of the government of Botswana 
decided that the country should have its own national television 
service. 
According to the letters of correspondence between the different 
ministries and departments of government the cabinet decision 
marked the culmination of a quiet but protracted argument that had 
been going on for almost ten years about a television service for 
Botswana, as will become evident as this thesis unfolds. 
The argument involved all the ministries of government through 
what was called the TV Reference Group, which was composed of 
permanent secretaries of the different ministries of government and 
who would meet from time to time at the Office of the President to 
discuss the TV issue and later brief their respective ministers. The 
group argued about the wisdom or otherwise of Botswana having its 
own television service, and the argument centred on whether the 
project could eventually become financially self-sustaining. 
The ITU Report 
The first concrete outcome of these debates was the report of a 
feasibility study for the introduction of a national television service in 
Botswana, published in March 1988, carried out by the International 
Telecommunication Union, ITU, an agency of the United Nations. 
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The work of the team had been carried out in consultation with 
Radio Botswana, various ministries and departments of government 
and the University of Botswana. 
In brief, according to the terms of reference of the report, the 
team had been assigned to determine the marketing, technical, 
financial, economic, social and political feasibility of a TV facil ity in 
Botswana and to advise the government on the best organisational 
structure suitable for the service (Studio Hamburg Report, Hamburg, 
October 1993). 
The ITU team concluded that there were benefits that could be 
realised from such a project, but there were problems too. Some of the 
benefits of a TV service would be that it could foster a national identity, 
which would act as an educational tool to raise the standard of 
education; it would increase public awareness of the principles of 
health-care and modern farming methods suitable for Botswana 
agriculture, and it would promote Botswana's traditional culture. 
The team also highlighted what it saw as social dangers that 
would come with television. Some of these were: 
• the portrayal of violence, whether from real life or from fiction , 
which could be emulated, 
• sexual permissiveness, a danger more serious in view of the world 
AIDS epidemic. 
• the portrayal of affluent life styles which tends to promote 
dissatisfaction where there was none before, 
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• advertising that may promote trade but may also encourage 
overspending. The purchase of a TV set itself may, in many 
families, be an extravagance, 
• too much television promotes the habit of passivity and is a time-
waster. 
The team noted that these dangers were greater where young 
people or unsophisticated people were concerned. 
Despite the above list of disadvantages, the team concluded that 
Botswana's need was for a public service television, rather than a 
service run by a commercial company. They also said it was apparent 
that the income of such an operation, arising from advertising and 
programme sales would be well below its operating costs, even 
ignoring the substantial capital investment necessary. The consultants 
also said to bring TV to the remoter parts of the country "would be 
vastly expensive and should be regarded as a long term objective" 
(1993, p.4) . 
Response to the ITU Report 
The most powerful ministry in the government of Botswana is the 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, because it is the one 
that advises the government on whether or not a particular project is 
worth financing, and after studying the report the ministry responded: 
'The case for a television service in Botswana is extremely weak" 
(Letter: 28 April 1989). 
Its argument was that only 1.5 percent of the population would 
be able to afford a TV set and the licence fee, because the cost of a 
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TV set alone was the same as the annual average income, and 
investment in the first four years would be 40 million US dollars (80 
million Botswana Pula at the time, 1 U.S. dollar = 2 Pula). This 
translated into a 4 000 Pula subsidy per person of those capable of 
receiving Botswana TV. The recipients of this subsidy would mostly be 
the richest people in Botswana, and 20 percent of them would be 
expatriates. "This group of the population should not be a priority for 
large Government subsidies". 
The finance ministry said the main argument in favour of a TV 
service was that people in Botswana watched South African TV with its 
in-built apartheid propaganda content. But the report also 
recommended that the government should not interfere with the 
reception of South African and BOP TV. This would have meant that 
Botswana TV would have to compete with these two broadcasters in a 
neighbouring country. 
About the idea in the report of setting up Community TV-viewing 
Centres, the ministry said maintenance would be a problem in such a 
scheme, and concluded: 
In conclusion, we are of the view that the TV service is an 
expensive proposition which cannot be given priority over other 
important national programmes that we have embarked upon or 
planning to undertake in the context of our national development 
plan. 
The idea of a TV service was shot dead, almost, at least for the time 
being. The correspondence shows that there was a lull . 
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The debate was apparently picked up in 1990 when the Director 
of Information and Broadcasting, Ted Makgekgenene, revisited the 
1988 ITU Report and wrote a letter to the Permanent Secretary to the 
President re-evaluating that report (Letter: 27 August 1990). In the 
letter he said the report "did not evaluate possible options" and had 
not taken into consideration the fact that technological developments 
had brought about a somewhat cheaper option of using satellite as 
opposed to terrestrial microwave programme distribution. He said it did 
not seem fair to say that one of the options that the government had 
was "to abandon the idea of a television service on the basis of costs 
involved" and recommended that the 1988 ITU report be updated in 
the light of new technological developments, and a financial cost 
estimate determined, clearly indicating government's commitment for 
whatever option. He also warned: "If the recommendations are not 
carried out we might just as well forget about Botswana television". 
The Department of Information and Broadcasting is normally 
taken seriously by the government as its advisor on media matters, 
because every application to the Office of the President for anything 
that has to do with the media is first referred to that department for 
comment and advice. This is what also happened with the M-NET 
application (see below) . 
This was followed in 1990 by the commissioning of another 
feasibility study which would "review and update" the ITU report and 
provide fresh recommendations. While the ITU report had planned on 
a terrestrial microwave programme distribution system, the new study 
would explore the possibility of utilising satellite technology as a 
means of transmitting at national or regional level. 
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During the 1990 exercise to review the ITU report of 1988, the 
consultants that had produced it were called back. They spent a week 
in Gaborone helping government officials to review their own work. 
The government was apparently not influenced by the outcome 
of the review meetings because it did not change its position following 
the review. Instead, government called for a new study in the light of 
new technological developments, an option that had earlier been 
recommended by the Department of Information and Broadcasting in 
the letter cited above. 
Tenders were invited for the proposed new study. 
The MoNET Application 
In the interim, the Office of the President (OP) which is directly 
responsible for the media, continued to consider applications that they 
were receiving from foreign companies who wanted to set up some 
kind of TV service in Botswana. As usual, OP would rely heavily on 
advice from the Department of Information and Broadcasting. One 
such application came from M-NET of South Africa. 
According to their proposal dated April 1991 , M-NET wanted to 
establish a pay-television service for Botswana. Their TV signal would 
be beamed through satellite and re-transmitted on terrestrial 
transmitters in Botswana. The service would initially cover the capital 
city Gaborone and other towns like Francistown in the north, Selebi-
Phikwe in the centre and Lobatse in the south, and eventually all the 
other major towns in the country. The signal would be transmitted 
mostly in encoded form , thereby requiring the viewer to have a 
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decoder. Broadcasting would start at 10.30 am till 1.30 am. There 
would be a two-hour 'window' during which Botswana could transmit 
its own national programmes. 
The M-NET proposal was not accepted. In particular, the 
Department of Information and Broadcasting, in a letter to the Office of 
the President said: 
It will be somewhat difficult for us to involve ourselves with a 
South African-based company in the introduction of TV services 
in this country at this stage when we have nothing of our own, 
knowing very well the power of the media. We would be seen by 
the rest of the world to be another S.A. M-NET TV satellite, to 
say the least. It is one thing to use their services, and quite 
another to belong to them (Letter: 8 December 1989). 
The Croton Report 
While tenders were still being awaited, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, BBC, followed up on contacts that it had had earlier with 
some Botswana Government officials during which the subject of a 
television service for Botswana had come up. The BBC sent its Head 
of Training, Gordon Croton, on a fact-finding mission to Botswana. 
According to his seven page report, dated March 1992, when he 
arrived in Botswana he was asked "to focus as sharply as possible" 
the relevant issues pertaining to the setting up of television, and do a 
"short and direct" report which would set out in broad-based terms the 
main arguments for and against setting up a television facility "so that 
the decision-making process could be assisted" (1992, p.1). 
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After visiting several parts of the country and talking to a short 
list of people he stated: "Almost everybody to whom I spoke felt that 
there should be a national TV". The reasons given were: 
• to heighten and underline the sense of national identity, 
• to disseminate news and local affairs, 
• and to present public service information in areas such as 
education, agriculture and health (The Croton Report, Gaborone, 
March 1992). 
Croton said the idea that there could be regular, in-depth 
programmes transmitted nationally on television in areas of public 
health and education, while attractive, "does not fit the facts of 
modern broadcasting and audience viewing patterns". He did not 
elaborate. Commenting on the ITU report and comparing it to his 
own report, Croton said: 
This is a detailed, impressive document, which examines almost 
every aspect of the television service in Botswana. In all respects 
it must obviously be seen as a much more significant 
assessment of facts and analysis than this short report can be 
(1992:1 ). 
In summary, he concluded that to pursue the lines of approach 
recommended by the ITU report of 1988 would involve "massive 
expatriate support" and the scale of the operation would be such 
that the real cost of sustaining it would be ''very heavy indeed". His 
principal recommendation was that consideration should be given to 
the creation of "a carefully developed, properly financed Botswana 
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news and current affairs television service which would set out to 
provide a national and local news and, perhaps, also be the conduit 
for world news" (1992: 4). He also said attention should be given to 
the possibility of satellite broadcasting. 
Tenders for yet another consultancy were still being awaited but 
the BBC itself was not going to compete for the tender because "the 
BBC in normal circumstances never tenders for consultancies" 
(Croton, 1992:1). The new consultants would be expected to give 
other scenarios besides what the BBC was suggesting. 
The itinerary of Croton's visits in Botswana, which is attached to 
the report, shows that he held meetings with seven permanent 
secretaries, one cabinet minister in the Office of the President who 
was responsible for the media, and seven senior members of the staff 
of the Department of Information and Broadcasting. He also visited the 
small diamond-mining town of Jwaneng in western Botswana to see a 
small television facility that re-broadcast programmes of SABC 
television using a Signal-booster transmitter. 
What Croton was proposing was not a fully-fledged television 
station but the first stage of a modular development of television in 
Botswana. This is why it would have cost less than the one envisaged 
four years earlier by the ITU consultants. Regarding the people he 
talked to, they did not represent a cross section of any community, as 
it was only 15 civil servants and one politician. This is not to say that 
they were not pivotal in the decision-making process on the TV issue. 
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The Studio Hamburg Report 
A German company, Studio Hamburg Media Consult 
International, won the long awaited tender. It was assigned to update 
previous studies done on the subject of television by different 
consultants at different times "and make recommendations in the light 
of available broadcasting technologies, including satellite technology". 
They submitted the report of their consultancy to the government in 
October 1993, which put forward four scenarios for a TV service, and 
assumed that the service would start in 1997. The fou r scenarios of 
ownership of the TV service were: 
(a) Government Department 
(b) Parastatal Corporation 
(c) Joint Venture 
(d) Private Company 
All scenarios assumed revenues from licence fees. 
For their part, the consultants were of the view that the selection of the 
scenario would depend primarily on the Government of Botswana's 
expectations concerning programme quality and its willingness to 
invest in a prestigious project. 
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Response to the Studio Hamburg Report 
In their assessment of the report, the TV Reference Group of 
permanent secretaries concluded that the report had serious 
shortcomings in the technical and financial arguments presented. 
Besides, capital costs were "very high". Initial investment for the Joint 
Venture scenario (Government and private company) would be 33 
million Pula, Parastatal Corporation 57 million Pula, Government 
Department 70 million Pula, and Private Company 26 million Pula. 
The view of the Department of Information and Broadcasting was 
that the parastatal scenario was more attractive. The TV Reference 
Group, in an attempt to look for another scenario that was not in the 
report, put forward the idea of a production house that could be 
constructed at Government expense to produce TV programmes that 
could be broadcast on "windows" provided by eXisting TV outfits. 
These outfits were receiving signals from the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation TV, which they boosted when they reached 
Botswana for better reception quality. In other words, these operations 
functioned like small TV stations. They operated on the basis of 
technical licences issued by the Botswana Telecommunications 
Corporation. Eight such stations operated: Gaborone, Lobatse, 
Jwaneng, Morupule, Serowe, Selebi-Phikwe, Francistown and Orapa. 
Some of them had small studios and transmitted their own local 
programmes in the evening. 
But the Department of Information and Broadcasting argued that 
these small TV stations could not be presented as an alternative 
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option to any of the scenarios that had been presented by the 
Studio Hamburg Report because they were too small and 
inadequate to fulfil the requirements of public broadcasting, and 
therefore rejected the idea of a TV programme-production house 
that had been suggested by the TV Reference Group. The 
department also cautioned that whatever type of service would be 
decided on, it had to be borne in mind. that a Botswana TV service 
was going to face serious competition from SABe TV and M-NET. 
These had long overcome their "teething problems" and Botswana 
viewers would have "very little patience to tolerate our own". The 
department also advised that satellite programme distribution 
should be part of the initial capital outlay to afford the service 
flexibility and simplify acceptability to all parts of the country. 
This did not mean no attention was given to the existing TV 
repeater stations. The department recommended that they should 
be left to "market forces", although some legislation should be 
developed to guide their operations. 
The TV Reference Group of permanent secretaries concluded 
that all the four scenarios that had been presented by Studio Hamburg 
had shown that the introduction of a television service would not be 
financially viable and they saw no basis for proceeding with the 
project, but then stated: 
If Government decided to go ahead with this television project, 
the justification would have to be based on other considerations 
rather than economic viabil ity 
(Savingram, 19 June 1996). 
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The permanent secretaries recommended that the cabinet 
should advise the President to direct that the recommendations 
contained in the Studio Hamburg Report on the establishment of a fully 
fledged television service in Botswana "be rejected", and instead have 
a small television facility established within the Department of 
Information and Broadcasting to produce and broadcast news and 
current affairs programmes at an initial capital cost of 10.5 million Pula. 
They also recommended to cabinet that the total recurrent budget of 
the Department of Information and Broadcasting should be increased 
by 15 percent "to cater for the television component", and that the TV 
unit should be allowed to run and develop commercially so that it could 
be "self-liquidating in the future" (1996: 6) 
It would appear that the government took time to study the 
implications of the recommendations, and after eight months, on 
March 26th 1997, the cabinet decided that Botswana should have its 
own television service and the project would be implemented by the 
Department of Information and Broadcasting. No debate was supplied 
by cabinet as to why the state scenario was the preferred model. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the approach that has been followed by 
the Government of Botswana regarding the role of broadcasting media 
in the country and radio in particular, and why a television service was 
not introduced in the last century until now. 
29 
The chapter has also revealed that the behaviour of the decision-
makers within the top echelons of the civil service on the issue of 
introducing television was not consistent, and there was lack of detail 
to explain clearly why Botswana should have a television service. This 
lack of clarity and transparency applies to the cabinet itself, because 
every time a decision had to be made by government on reports of 
feasibility studies, there was no clear position, a statement saying what 
the position of government was. Also, the very decision that was taken 
in March 1997 to have a television service has no publicly recorded 
justification. In other words, there is no public reason why Botswana 
now has a TV station, and what the service, as a tool, is going to be 
used for. 
However, it is clear that the report on the Information Functions of 
Government that was done by A.J . Hughes in 1968 became the 
government's media policy for a long time. This appears to be so 
because, even without referring to the report specifically, the argument 
against the introduction of television had for many years centred on 
the high cost of the service and the lack of electricity in rural 
households. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
This thesis is assessing the Botswana television project in terms 
of its potential to contribute to the development of the country, 
particularly rural development, and specifically in the area of health. 
Before one can make any meaningful assessment, one has to place 
that assessment in the context of the model of development that is 
followed by Botswana, and that model itself has to be placed within the 
range of models of development that have been formulated up to this 
point in time. 
The chapter will therefore discuss possible sources of insight on 
the part of some writers who formulated theories of development to 
see what their real aim was. The various development theories shall 
also be discussed in brief. There is also a general discussion on the 
impact of the various development models on the countries of the 
Third World, particularly Africa. 
Some of the theories that have been formulated include those of 
growth, modernisation, dependency, institutionalist, Marxist, and global 
interdependence. 
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In approaching the topic of development one will have to discuss 
one's own definition and meaning of development. The meaning will 
then be used as a tool for assessing the models of development that 
are going to be discussed in this chapter. 
Development is a problematic term and concept. It would 
appear that there is no one meaning for the term. It would also appear 
that there are as many meanings as there are users of the term, as will 
become evident as the chapter proceeds. Besides, a user of the term 
is obliged to re-define and update its meaning now and then by adding 
additional ingredients and elements in order to make the meaning 
more relevant to the times. In other words, the meaning of the term 
development some fifty years ago cannot be the same in the new 
millennium. 
The author's own definition and meaning of development is that 
development must necessarily emphasise the development of the 
human person as the goal of development. Therefore the package of 
elements that the human person, as the subject of development 
should receive must be geared towards making the person effective in 
working his or her way out of poverty. 
One's understanding and assumption here is that poverty is not 
inevitable, it is not impossible to eradicate, it must never be tolerated 
and there are prerequisites to its eradication. The key prerequisites are 
economic growth and a sound social policy. In the first place, growth is 
possible because the poor themselves are a pool of labour that can 
contribute to growth. In order for them to do that, a social policy must 
give them good health and education; they must have access to land, 
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to public transport, to health facilities, to the Internet and electronic 
mail, water, telephone, marketing infrastructure, radio and television. 
The linkages between and among the above factors are that if 
people have land and produce their food they will improve their daily 
calorie intake. They do not have to depend on government handouts. 
Education equips them with skills, and good health gives them 
capacity to be more productive and contribute to economic growth, 
which in turn can sustain education and health if the social policy is 
geared towards doing that and towards equitable redistribution of the 
benefits of growth. 
There is logic in investing funds in education at primary, high 
school and tertiary and making that education available to children of 
the poor as well, through subsidies, and not just to those of a small 
elite. A problem could be created if educational subsidies stop at 
primary school level because that could create a big population of 
young people with inadequate skills, which they cannot use for their 
own survival. As a result they would not be able to contribute to the 
required growth, and any growth shall in turn be slowed down, and the 
goal of human development would be undermined. 
The importance of adequate skills was highlighted recently at a 
conference in Botswana, National Conference on Citizen Economic 
Empowerment, where a delegate representing Botswana's Rural 
Development Council , which is chaired by the Vice-President of the 
country, said the relatively slow reduction of poverty in rural areas is a 
result of the inability of rural dwellers to take advantage of the 
expanding economic development opportunities availed by the 
Government, and stated: 
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Undoubtedly, most Batswana lack not only capital to invest in 
business, but also the requisite skills to venture into business 
activities. Lack of entrepreneurial skills undermines effective 
participation in economic opportunities and also hampers 
successful business development for those who have 
endeavoured to participate. 
(Citizen Economic Empowerment in the Context of Rural 
Development, Rural Development Council , Gaborone, July 5-7,1999, 
pAl· 
This statement was being made 33 years after Botswana's 
independence and there are many possible reasons for this state of 
affairs, including the possibility that there were no social policies put in 
place that were geared towards equipping people with such skills. 
On the other hand, there are examples in some parts of the 
world , especially in East Asia, where governments have formulated 
policies directed at helping the poor. One such country is Malaysia 
which has demonstrated in a small way that investment in an 
appropriate type of education for a country can lift its poor population 
from abject poverty. Through education, the government increased the 
quality and quantity of the factors of production available to the poor, 
and created a professional, commercial and industrial class to enable 
the poor to uplift themselves from poverty and participate in all aspects 
of the economic life of the nation. 
(Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, July 5-7, 1999) 
As the discussion now focuses on theories of development, 
particular attention will be paid to the role of the media in each of the 
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development paradigms. The role of the media in development shall 
be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Growth Theory 
One of the first theories was the Growth Theory, which is 
associated with the American economist Walt Rostow. It was 
expounded in the 1950s and continued into the 1960s (Siddle and 
Swindell, 1990). Rostow's analysis was based on data that was 
available for only 15 countries. 
He said all societies could be located at some pOint along a 
development axis which was marked by five stages; that a traditional 
society should have pre-conditions for take-off, then actually take-off 
into self-sustaining growth, and drive itself to maturity until it reaches 
the age of high mass consumption. 
This is too small a sample from which one can expound what 
can be called a world theory. Even in terms of Africa today, the 
number he used would be only the member countries of the Southern 
African Development Community, SADC, and they cannot seriously be 
used to expound a continental theory on anything. 
One of the weaknesses of this model is that Rostow describes a 
macro-economic phenomenon and assumed growth, but does not say 
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what the goal of that growth should be and how citizens of the 
concerned country would benefit from that growth. His is a description 
of an automatic process, which is simplistic and unrealistic. One does 
not see in the theory any mechanism for delivering the "high mass 
consumption" which seems to be the goal of his mechanical process, 
nor the target population for what is to be consumed. 
Therefore, for the masses, the high consumption would just be one of 
the pies in the sky. 
The role of the media in this model would be to promote high 
consumption, which is not a developmental role in the context of 
development as defined above. 
Modernization Theory 
This theory follows on from the growth theory. It was influenced 
by the desire of the USA to combat the influence of the USSR in the 
Third World, during the Cold War. Basically, the authors of the theory 
wanted to offer the newly decolonised countries a supposedly easy 
and better path from the traditional to the modern world , so that in a 
short time they could acquire the status of developed economies and 
societies. 
A prominent feature of the theory is that its proponents gathered 
a large body of aggregate data and used it to construct models of 
growth and assessment of economic performance. They postulated 
that change was going to be produced by the economic activities of 
elites in the cities, and their activities would result in some benefits 
'trickling down' to the poor folks in the cities and 'cascade' down to the 
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urban hierarchy until they reach those in the smallest village in the 
country (Brohman, 1996). 
But industrial development did not take that route. This produced 
anger from such authors as Frank (1971), who wrote about a new 
"clientship of neo-colonialization". Others who wrote in the same vein 
included Rodney (1972), Fanon (1967), and Amin (1973). They seem 
to have been angered about the experience of underdevelopment of 
the Third World by the capitalist countries of the North. 
The model is based on the hope that some benefits would 'trickle 
down' but does not articulate how that was supposed to come about. It 
does not even place any obligation, let alone duty, on those running 
the government of the newly decolonised country to guarantee that 
indeed some benefits do reach down to those on the ground. There is 
no re-distribution mechanism in the model. Like the growth theory, it 
does not say anything about human development, not even about the 
impact that the 'trickles' are expected to have on the people the day 
they reach down to them. It is essentially a model that would promote 
government handouts at best, an activity which does not equip people 
with skills to do anything for themselves. 
One does not see any useful role for the media in this theory, a 
role that could promote people's participation in their own self-
development. Simply put, people do not feature anywhere in this 
theory. Like the growth theory, the media would simply promote high 
consumption by the elites and do nothing useful for the general 
population. 
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Institutionalist Theory 
The theory was also born around 1950, and like the growth 
theory it also continued into the 1960s, a period when European 
colonial powers were formally withdrawing from the colonies in Africa 
south of the Sahara. Briefly, the theory is concerned with the project 
of reworking long-established colonial relationships so that over a 
period of time the elite in a colony who is articulating the ideas of 
nationalist development could safely be installed as a government 
(Preston, 1996). The understanding seems to be that, as the colonial 
power departed, the indigenous elite would, through their own 
institutions, work co-operatively with the institutions of the departed 
colonial power, and 'development' aid would flow smoothly to the 
former colony. The assumption seems to have been that this new 
relationship would work smoothly because it was underpinned and 
informed by the actual experience of the colonial episode, and a 
history of close relationships which were forged with the new ruling 
elite during the colonial period. 
The definition of development embodied in this theory is, like 
others that have been discussed before it, based on the assumption 
that the political elite of a newly decolonised country, by working co-
operatively with the ruling elite in the former 'mother' country, would 
reap some economic benefits like aid from that relationship, and that 
aid would somehow end up benefiting the population. 
This model is weak because it does not explain how this was 
supposed to happen. It assumes an automatic process without any 
social policy designed to intervene and deliver the expected benefits to 
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the poor and to equip them to participate in the economy of their own 
country. The theory therefore has a 'trickle down' assumption, which 
has already failed. 
There is nothing convincing in the development theories that 
have been discussed up to this point that they were designed to 
benefit the general citizenry of the developing countries. On the 
contrary, it would appear that the way that the economic models that 
are based on these theories function , that they were either meant to 
benefit the ruling elites in the 'mother' countries or those in the former 
colony, or both . This appears to be so because the economic models 
tend to connect both elites, and shut out the populations of both 
countries. 
The media in a situation like this, especially radio and television, 
would be more likely to be state-owned and not allowed to criticise 
government as it is usually the case in many newly decolonised 
countries. The role of the media would therefore be defined by the 
government, very similar in a way to the role of radio in Botswana after 
independence in 1966 until 1999 when the first private radio station 
was licensed, a role that was spelt out in the report by A.J. Hughes on 
the Information Functions of Government which is discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
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Dependency Theory 
This is one of the theories that emerged in the 1970s. It 
originated in Latin America. The theme of the theory is that peripheral 
countries are permanently condemned to structural underdevelopment 
through their subordinate role in the world capitalist system (Siddle 
and Swindel, 1990). 
The theory says the transfer of surpluses from Third World 
countries by international capital through negative terms of trade and 
repatriation of profits and over-invoicing of imported goods, which were 
all reinforced by colonialism, were afterwards continued during the 
period of independence by the co-operation between "national 
bourgeoisie" and transnational corporations. 
This theory has a conceptual relationship with the Institutionalist 
theory, because while it simply describes the nature of a neo-colonial 
trade relationship and decries it, without necessarily explaining why it 
happens, the Institutionalist Theory explains that this situation happens 
because as the colonial power departed, the indigenous elite work co-
operatively with the institutions of the departed colonial power, so that 
'development' aid can smoothly flow. So the balance sheet is that the 
aid flows from the funds that accumulate from over-invoiced goods 
exported to the former colony, while goods imported from the former 
colony, which would predominantly be raw material would be paid for 
by the elites in the former 'mother' country at prices dictated by them. 
Since the situation described by the Dependency Theory is a 
post-colonial one, the broadcasting media would in most cases be 
state-owned and would therefore be expected to broadcast what the 
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government says it should. If there is a social policy in place that is 
geared towards making ordinary people in the rural areas participate in 
decision-making processes to uplift themselves from poverty, the 
media could be used to promote such a policy. However, the 
broadcasting activity, no matter how efficient the chosen 
communication model, could be a sterile activity if development is only 
about benefits that are expected to 'trickle down' and nothing more. 
Global Interdependence 
The modernization theory represented something of a 
consensus within "orthodox" development theory, but consensus 
"broke down" in the 1970s, and no new consensus developed 
thereafter (Preston, 1996). 
The key idea represented in the 1970s was that of global 
interdependence. Among other things the perspective called for a new 
international economic order, or NIEO, as it was later commonly 
referred to. Its main concern was that there must be a transfer of 
resources from the rich industrialised countries to the poor developing 
countries to meet their basis needs in development. In addition it 
called for reforms in trade regimes, monetary reforms, debt relief and 
transfer of modern technology to upgrade the economies of the poor 
countries and integrate them as equal partners within the global 
economic system. 
There is something innocent and na'ive about this perspective. 
Those who formulated it seem to have assumed that there was a 
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desire and willingness on the part of the ruling regimes in the 
industrialised countries and their nations to see the poor countries of 
the Third World industrialised or developed to the level of their own. 
There appears to be some element of sadism which is highlighted by 
the explanation given above that if any benefits were to flow from the 
ruling elite in the former 'mother' country they would go directly to the 
ruling elite in the former colony, and definitely not to the population in 
general. The question at issue, even if it was not asked, was, at 
whose cost or expense was the NIEO going to be realised? Who was 
going to finance it? Obviously not the poor countries. It would therefore 
have to be at the cost of the industrialised countries. They could not 
agree to that, because that would alter, almost overnight, the colonial 
relationship that exists between the two blocks of countries. The theory 
was an economic non-starter. 
Because the trade regimes were not reformed, nor any of the 
factors that would have led to economic integration of the poor 
countries with the developed ones, the hoped for marriage was not 
consummated simply because it did not happen. 
There would be no point therefore discussing the weakness or 
otherwise of the Global Interdependence theory or the role of the 
media in that development paradigm as that would be mere 
speculation. Again, there does not appear to be any valid economic 
argument that the wealthy countries need to uplift the poorer ones 
which does not have a moral perspective, If the argument does not 
have an obvious moral perspective then it is likely to have a covert 
plan to continue to enrich the wealthy countries, which amounts to the 
same thing. 
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Marxist Theory 
Marxist theorists, using class as their instrument of analysis, 
concluded that in the developed capitalist countries, the state and the 
system of laws facilitated the systematic exploitation of the workers by 
capitalists . Using the metaphor of 'the base', the mode of production 
determined the 'superstructure' , ideas, culture and the legal order, they 
also concluded that since the capitalist class dominated the mode of 
production in that system, its ideas and its laws would dominate the 
culture and the legal order. As a result, the laws that the state enacted 
and implemented were seen as tending to reproduce and strengthen 
the class relations of production, and necessarily that enhanced the 
power and privilege of those already on top of the heap (Seidman and 
Anang, 1992:255). 
What underlies this view is that in a capitalist state the economic 
arrangements and the means of production are not meant to benefit 
the poor whose labour is used for production, but to benefit the owners 
of the means of production. Therefore that state of affairs could 
change only if the workers themselves could rise, overthrow the ruling 
capitalist class and seize the means of production, own them and earn 
all the fruits of their own labour. 
The media in this type of state would still serve the capitalist 
class. It would not make any difference whether such media were 
state-owned or privately owned, or both . 
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Assessment of the Theories 
Some of the theories of development that have been discussed 
earlier in this chapter assumed that the meaning of development and 
its goal were clear and simple and that development would be attained 
in practice. But some of the problems that should have been solved by 
the same models of development, problems like unemployment and 
poverty persisted and new ones cropped up. As a result, those people 
who were involved in development work began to look for new 
approaches to development. 
Many writers , like Koda and Omari (1989), have criticised many 
of the old theorists who developed theories on the basis that their 
understanding of the theorists of the meaning of development, 
particularly when applied to areas like Africa, was wrong because it 
had "conceptual blinkers" and "methodological strait-jackets". Instead, 
the critics argue, there should be a broader, more flexible vision of 
development that is capable of addressing diverse Third World 
realities. 
One of the views is that development must provide productive 
employment opportunities and an improved quality of life for all. 
One of the fundamental problems of development in Africa, 
which is a big hindrance, is that the best land and infrastructure were 
allocated to export crops, like in Zimbabwe where the best land is 
allocated to tobacco production farms, and this practice marginalized 
small farmers, particularly women . This hindered expansion of 
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cultivation of food crops for the growing population and caused 
counter productive environment effects (Koda and Omari, 1989). Also, 
the lack of domestic capital left key sectors of the economy in the 
hands of foreign firms, and they, in collaboration with domestic firms, 
profited by selling cheap labour-intensive exports, crude agricultural 
and mineral products, and importing manufactured consumer goods 
and machinery which are used for producing lUxury goods which are 
used for the high income groups, goods like beer and cigarettes 
(Mudenda, 1985). 
Another hindrance in African efforts to introduce export-oriented 
manufacturing industry is that their products encounter problems as 
markets in industrialised countries narrow because of recessions and 
competition, thus making the terms of trade even worse. A case in 
point is the protracted argument that lasted the whole of 1998 and 
1999 about the brand names and labels of some South African wines 
that were exported to European Union countries and had potential to 
compete with wines produced by some European countries. 
Another argument is that the goal of development was 
expressed in terms of Eurocentrism, that is preference for projects 
reflecting the needs of the donors, and aid was wrongly focussed on 
infrastructure or tied to donors. There is also a suggestion of collusion 
and corruption in the whole development game, "such that the 
interests of the rich in the metropoles and the corrupt elites in the 
periphery are served at the expense of the poor" (Preston,1996b: 151). 
Lipton (1979) has also argued that people are discriminated 
against through the location of public services, industry, wages and 
depression of agricultural prices to serve the interest of the town's folk. 
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Perhaps the original cause of most of the problems of 
development is a tendency to worship theories that had been 
formulated in the West. Brohman (1996) seems to have a point when 
he says there is a tendency to pay homage to influential theories of the 
past rather than to construct new and more appropriate frameworks. 
Realities of the South should not be made to fit the theory. On the 
contrary, it is the theory that should be tested on the realities of the 
South. 
Another problem of development that has been identified is that 
the theoreticians and practitioners of development seem to occupy 
different worlds and speak different languages, and theoretical models 
are "too formal istic and abstract to be relevant to the everyday world of 
their WOUld-be beneficiaries (Brohman, 1996c: 326). People are 
treated as objects to be studied, rather than as subjects of 
development in their own right, whose knowledge and interpretations 
of the world might contribute to the findings and design of development 
work. Brohman emphasizes that if development is fundamentally about 
processes of human action than just about goods and services, then it 
is clear that development theory must deepen its understanding of 
what it is to be human. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed some development theories and 
models as well as possible sources of insight on the part of those who 
expounded such theories. The meaning of development was 
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discussed with a view to evaluating and assessing given theories and 
models of development. 
The conclusion reached is that development is a problematic 
term and in order for it to make sense in any discussion one has to 
explain its meaning in the particular context of that discussion. 
Most of the development theories discussed here have not 
worked for Africa, including Botswana, and one does not see how they 
can provide any meaningful development without effective social policy 
interventions designed to produce desired outcomes. Desired 
outcomes may not come automatically. 
In the case of Botswana, the government perceives the state as the 
principal and leading participant in the development of the country and 
in the context of health which is an integral part of the topic of this 
thesis, Vision 2016, the government document that contains a long 
term vision for Botswana, says the number of doctors that are 
produced in Botswana is not enough and health facilities in many 
areas are understaffed. It says there must be an ambitious programme 
to catch up with the pace of infrastructural development, and 
continues: "For example, we must establish a medical school at the 
University of Botswana as a matter of urgency" (Vision 2016, p.51). 
There is also another promise: 'We must develop and strengthen 
programmes specific to the health needs of women, in particular 
adolescents, menopausal and elderly women" (Vision 2016, p.51). 
At this point this has not yet happened. For example, a medical 
school has not yet been established at the University of Botswana. 
Nevertheless it gives the impression that someone was thinking about 
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people, and a particular group of people for that matter, as the goal of 
development. 
What is missing in the development theories that have been discussed 
above is that they do not emphasize the development of the human 
person as the goal of development. It is the view of this author that the 
human person must be the subject of and reason for development, 
and must receive a package of elements that are geared towards 
making the person effective in working his or her way out of poverty. In 
order for the person to do that, a social policy must give him or her 
good health and education, access to land, to public transport, to 
health facilities, to the Internet and its technologies, water, telephone, 
marketing infrastructure, radio and television . As discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, the linkages between and among the above 
factors are many and important. For example, if people produce their 
own food they can improve their daily calorie intake. They do not have 
to depend on government hand-outs or on crumbs dropping from the 
high table, which are euphemistically referred to in some of the 
literature on development as the 'trickle down effect'. If the human 
person is not at the centre of development there is a real possibility 
that one could have a rich country that belongs to a poor people, 
simply because the people are not the goal of the country's 
development activity. 
In addition there must be gender equality, popular participation in 
democracy and development activities, and the respect and protection 
for people's rights and freedoms. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MEDIA AND DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to search for a communication model 
that could be appropriate for Botswana television if it were to be used 
to contribute to development, particularly rural development, and in the 
area of health, including campaigns against the AIDS pandemic. As 
will be evident in the chapter, there are assumptions that it shall be 
used for development. 
In the search for an appropriate communication model, a general 
tour is made of current sites of debates in the African continent 
regarding the role of communication in development. The discussion 
brings in debates about the politics of Africa and the Information 
Superhighway. This is necessary because, in appraising the old and 
well known theories and models of communication, one has to bear in 
mind that when they were formulated in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
situation then was different from today's. For example, there was no 
Internet to reckon with, and there were no debates about the 
Information Superhighway. The theories, models and concepts in 
question are such as the two-step flow, multi-step flow, homophilly, 
heterophilly, knowledge-gap hypothesis, agenda setting, and 
knowledge-attitude-practice and convergence model. 
In some sense most of these concepts were developed or 
formulated during times when the concept of nation-state was still 
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intact and when many people were consuming the media output of 
their own countries, irrespective of whether those media were 
government owned or privately owned. In most cases there were no 
cultural differences between the audience and the people who 
produced the media products, whether the products were news or 
general programmes. 
The situations that obtained then have now been disturbed and 
the institution of nation state itself is under threat because of the 
phenomenon of globalisation and broadcast satellite technologies, and 
audiences inside their national boundaries are consuming media 
products produced in many different parts of the world. For example, a 
good number of people in the urban areas of Botswana watch South 
African, American and European television channels through satellite 
technology. 
In the light of these developments, many of the old theories of 
communication that had become classic have now become inadequate 
and should be used with care, and some of them, like oramedia, 
development support communication, organisational communication, 
conversation and "uses and gratification" are going to be reviewed in 
this light. 
Africa and the Information Superhighway 
The whole debate about Africa and the information 
superhighway cannot be rolled out here, but, in brief, some of that 
debate is that the information highway has enhanced interpersonal, 
intergroup and international communication, using technologies like 
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cable TV, high definition TV, satellite antenna systems, VCR, teletext, 
fax, lasers, digital recording and electronic mail , but Africa is yet to 
experience the full blast of such technologies (Nyamnjoh, 1996). 
Okigbo has a pessimistic view of the new communication 
technologies: 
Far from changing the situation in favour of Africa, the new 
communication technologies have made it easier and faster to 
collect, process and distribute information that is injurious to the 
image of African nations (1995:112). 
He also claims that if the new information technologies have 
strengthened Western societies, they have made Africa weaker. 
In many respects, when compared to the West, Africa has always 
been weaker, and the arrival of the new information technologies could 
not be expected to do miracles for the continent and strengthen it 
overnight. After all, the technologies were developed in the West for 
the benefit of the people of the West, and not those of Africa. If Africa 
wants to benefit it must understand that it must work hard and pay a 
huge price. For example, because Botswana TV uses satellite 
transmission, it pays the Pan American Satellite company some four 
million Pula every year for the space they have booked on the 
transponder. Even if they were to stop transmission for months they 
would still pay, so long as the space is still under their name. 
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Oramedia 
Oramedia, or indigenous forms of communication, should have 
been used in many of the situations where communication was an 
important tool for facilitating development (Uboajah, 1985). The 
distinctive feature of these communications are "their capacity to 
speak to the common man" in his language and idioms when dealing 
with problems that are directly relevant to his situation. In this case, 
communication takes place in a "non-artificial milieu". Gestures, body 
language, facial expressions, symbols and folklore are predominant in 
the communication. Song, drama, dance groups and the like can be 
used to promote campaigns against evils like alcohol ism, AIDS, 
discrimination against women, outmoded taboos, advances in farming, 
health, nutrition and family welfare, national unity and integration. All 
these should be combined with mass media. 
Oramedia communications are rarely used in Botswana, and 
according to Nyamnjoh, they are not in common use in many African 
countries, and he states: 
In other parts of the world experiments have been conducted on 
how indigenous channels could be combined with the mass 
media for better effect. But in Africa the tendency is still for 
professional journalists, politicians and even researchers to 
overlook the indigenous channels of communication, and to 
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focus predominantly on the mass media, as vehicles of news, 
facts, ideas, and information in general (1996, p.11) 
One can conclude that while Nyamnjoh is presenting a plausible 
argument, the problem is that these alternative forms of 
communication have not been researched well enough to be able to 
be formulated into models or theories of communication. This does not 
mean that they cannot be effective forms of communication until they 
are called theories, because it is true that the majority of people in 
Africa do receive messages through indigenous channels of 
communication, including those of Botswana. He also identifies other 
forms of communication, which though not necessarily indigenous, 
need to be studied, forms like festivals, soccer, churches, clinics, 
schools, beer-drinking halls, and rumour. Therefore, one sees 
oramedia as a form of communication that is full of potential in the use 
of television for development in Botswana. 
Development Support Communication 
This is a sub-set of development communication. It is specifically 
designed and implemented to support a particular development 
programme (Ngugi , 1995). It applies generally to micro or local 
entities. It is concerned with effects, it is goal oriented, it is time-bound, 
takes the form of campaigns, and is participatory and interactive. 
The model is widely used by United Nations agencies and non-
governmental organizations, and is being increasingly adopted by 
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governments . For this model to work, four basic components must be 
put in place: 
(a) The nature of the issue on which the campaign is to be based 
must be thrashed out properly, 
(b) The audience for whom the campaign is meant must be 
defined clearly, 
(c) The nature of the media to be used must be clarified, and 
(d) The socio-political and economic context with in which the 
campaign is to be launched must be known. 
This model can be used in Botswana, but it would need developing 
further. For instance, it is not clear what kind of variables should obtain 
on the ground in order for it to work, ideally. Some research must be 
done first among the target population before the model can be 
implemented, in order to know the audience. It could have high 
financial implementation costs. It can be used for special campaigns, 
provided money is allocated to do the research first. Another 
shortcoming is that the model is not sufficiently interactive. That can be 
added on, for example by having a respected member of the 
community where the target population lives sit among the audience to 
watch TV campaign broadcasts, after the person has been properly 
briefed on the campaigns, so that he or she can help the audience 
make sense of the programme after the broadcast. A respected 
member of the community is important for reasons of credibil ity. 
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Organizational Communication 
The point of departure of this model is that the use of 
interpersonal, small groups and organizations has been ignored, 
because African development studies have focused on the use of 
mass media (Onwumechili , 1995). Mass media create awareness but 
not much knowledge. A case is quoted of a study done by Nyirenda 
(1986) in Zambia of children and women's vaccination, which 
demonstrated the limitations of mass media. He found significantly 
high awareness of mass media messages on immunization against 
diseases, but very little knowledge and actual practice. 
Interpersonal practice is seen as providing the highest quality of 
communication, highly correlated to persuasive ability. Organisational 
communication provides context where members know each other 
relatively well to achieve quality communication, and the number of 
members is large enough to achieve an appreciable multiplication of 
influence. 
The argument here again is that organizations, both at formal 
and informal levels, already exist in the rural areas. For example, there 
are women's organizations, local councils , youth organizations and co-
operative societies. Mass media messages are seen as designed 
mainly for masses or large audiences that involve several differing 
groups, and in ethnically diverse African countries, mass media 
messages are couched in a "Western-style format" (Adesonaye, 
1990) and are often delivered in the national "business language", 
English, French or Portuguese, in order to reach a national audience. 
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Although these channels of communication have not been 
developed in Botswana. They seem to make a lot of sense, except that 
generally speaking, the church as an organization is usually reluctant 
to transmit messages that have nothing to do with church activities. 
Uses and Gratification Model 
This is one of the models over which there have been 
considerable differences over what the media do to people or what 
people do to the media. The first conclusion from what used to be 
called "uses and gratification" research was that people were "a mass 
of monolithic, passive and gullible receptacles of any communication 
cue that came their way" (Emenyeonu, 1995). With more research in 
this area, new thinking came about which said it was not quite true to 
say that the media did things to people, on the contrary, it was the 
people who did something to the media. They bend the media to their 
needs more readily than the media overpower them (Katz, Gurevitch 
and Haas, 1973) 
The general consensus seems to be that different people use the 
media for different reasons. For example, there are those who use the 
media for guidance, to solve problems, for decision - making and good 
management. Others use the media for the media's own sake, without 
regard to content. 
While these conclusions seem academically valid, it is not clear 
which media- TV, radio, print, and type of content- satisfy which 
categories of people. 
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Emenyeonu's contention is that programme choice is a rational 
action motivated by expectancy of gratification, that is, programme 
selection would be influenced by programme contents, which best 
satisfy specific needs and that individual choice is influenced by 
programme content. But when a family is viewing together, programme 
loyalty decreases. On the other hand, he argues that it is likely to be 
maintained when viewing with peers or mates. 
A study done in Nigeria by Osadolor et al (1984) investigated 
media use among urban youths and showed that they preferred 
television to radio or newspapers, and they preferred current affairs, 
news and political debates to non-current affairs content. 
Another study done by Nwuneli (1984) of media usage by the 
urban poor showed that income and education were associated with 
media exposure, but film viewing and education could not be 
associated with anything . 
Yet another study done by Ogumodede (1988) explored the 
viewing habits of Nigerian adults and revealed that they viewed TV in 
order to know what other people think, obtaining up to date 
information, relaxation, fighting loneliness, passing time, and for 
having influence, in that order. The adults also sought programme 
variety on thei r TV sets by frequently moving the dials to other stations 
where they thought their needs would be better served. 
Although these studies do not go beyond the results and into 
what the meaning is for media usage and planning, the model can be 
useful to people who are in positions of media management. It would 
be useful for instance for programme planners at Botswana television 
to always bear in mind that their viewers are not going to lap up the 
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whole content of a particular programme; that they will select what 
satisfies their particular needs, or switch off completely. 
Conversation 
One of the important issues in this thesis is to look for different 
ways through which people who live in the rural areas of Africa 
generally and Botswana in particular get their information on health 
matters. This is important because if combating diseases and 
educating the people of Botswana through the use of television is 
expected to be one of the priorities of the government, the use of 
television for this purpose can be enhanced if other sources of 
information are also known so that such sources can be integrated into 
the planning of information and education campaigns. 
It has not been easy to find many such studies done in Africa. 
While studies done in Europe, America or China could also be useful; 
the African studies tend to provide quick relevance because of the 
cultural proximity of most African nations. Besides, most rural dwellers 
in Africa have a lot in common, that is poverty. 
One case study on the sources of health information among rural 
dwellers of two Ghanaian villages is quite instructive. The study 
examined the use in primary health care (Bosompra 1987) of such 
information channels as conversation, the town crier, the market place, 
churches, schools, health officers, and the radio. 
The findings were that conversation was the most popular but 
least trusted source of health information. Radio came second, both in 
terms of popularity and credibil ity, whereas the health officer was 
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ranked third in popularity but first in credibility. The study also revealed 
that the awareness level of the respondents was generally low and 
practical use of the knowledge acquired was minimal. 
A similar study, undertaken by the School of Communication 
Studies of the University of Ghana in 1975 on sources of information 
about selected national affairs topics in Ghana, found that the most 
popular source of information was radio , followed by government 
officials, newspapers, and local authorities, in that order. The study 
was interested in how respondents obtained their information about 
cholera, AIDS, oral rehydration therapy, and treatment of water to 
make it safer to drink. 
The results of both studies were contrary to the expectations of 
the researchers. They said that they had expected that in an 
indigenous communication system such as obtained in the rural areas 
of Ghana, the town-crier or gong-man would be frequently cited 
sources of information on most issues, including health. 
Bosompra has observed that even though conversation came 
out as the most popular form of communication, the study did not give 
the exact circumstances under which the conversation should take 
place in order for it to become an effective and popular form of 
communication. 
While this observation is valid academically, one cannot ignore 
the fact that in many life situations conversation is likely to be popular 
because it normally takes place in relaxed circumstances, with high 
levels of noise, interjections and heckling, and without any co-
ordination. The fact that it came out as the least trusted source of 
information on health for example, could be that the participants in a 
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conversation do not know from where each one of them got the 
information that they are sharing with the group, thus creating a 
problem of credibility . On the other hand, radio, or the government 
health officer, are likely to be regarded as the voice of respected 
authority and therefore credible. In many rural situations these two 
sources of information could be treated as if it were the government 
itself speaking. 
While these studies are instructive, they were done in rural areas 
where there was no television as one of the sources of information, 
and therefore the conclusions drawn from them, and from radio 
particularly, cannot be automatically transferred to television because 
TV, which is the subject of this thesis, is a unique and different 
medium, and the same principles may not apply. This is not to say that 
they are entirely worthless. If they are to be applied they should be 
applied with caution and monitored closely. 
Community Viewing Centres (CVCs) 
In the report of the first feasibility study for the establishment of a 
TV service in Botswana in 1988, the ITU consultants discussed 
Community Group Viewing Centres, or CVCs. They said even in 
countries like Cote d'ivoire and Nigeria where TV signals "blanket" 
large portions of rural areas only "a tiny percentage" of rural people 
had access to TV sets, and in a number of African countries 
governments had made an effort to increase rural accessibility to 
television by developing group viewing of government - purchased 
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receivers . In areas without electricity rechargeable batteries, 
generators or solar energy would power the sets. 
At the time of putting their report together in 1988, the 
consultants said there were 20 000 government TV receivers in Cote 
d'ivoire, but many of them were broken because of inadequate 
maintenance. Senegal and Nigeria were experimenting with solar 
power. The government of Nigeria owned and maintained 2 000 
receivers, and 75 percent of them were run on solar energy, and the 
rest on electricity. Niger had taken maintenance "very seriously" and a 
repairman visited each village with a receiver every 45 days. 
According to the consultants, the advantage of group-viewing 
centres is that they become learning centres and a focal point for 
community discussions of the issues presented on TV. In their view: 
To be truly effective as an educational tool , television needs to 
be complemented by people in the field who can explain, focus 
discussion and help people apply what they have learned to their 
own lives. Without this essential element, television has a 
tendency to pass over the heads of target audiences and be 
seen as an interesting diversion of little relevance to their 
everyday lives (ITU Report, 1988:322). 
They recommended that the government of Botswana should establish 
community viewing centres at the rate of 250 a year or as many as it 
takes to provide rural Botswana with access to television. 
The problem of maintenance of TV sets could one of the factors 
that could make the government of Botswana decide against setting 
up viewing centres. But it is a common problem which is not only 
peculiar to Africa. In India, for example, the problem that they had with 
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their TV viewing centres was one of maintenance of the sets (Rao, 
1992). 
Notwithstanding maintenance problems, other writers, like Des 
Wilson (1987) for example, have argued that organising a TV service 
for the rural areas, including Community Viewing Centres (CVCs), and 
in terms of communication content, could be effectively harnessed to 
meaningfully penetrate the rural areas. The whole process could be 
carried out beyond the level of CVCs to the level of VCCs, Village 
Communication Centres, and then to the households. A village is 
something bigger than a community. 
What Wilson is proposing here is a four-step model that uses a 
combination of traditional and modern mass communication 
instruments. The four steps are: TV station, CVC, Gong-man, and 
Audience. The way it works is that a piece of communication is 
broadcast by the TV station, it is received by the TV viewing centre in 
the community where the Gong-man is part of the audience, and after 
the broadcast the Gong-man takes the message and delivers it to the 
people gathered at the village level. 
While this model sounds academically valid and does take the 
CVC beyond the community level to the village level, the four-steps 
involved are too many and could attract a lot of distortion of the 
message. Before it can be applied on a wider scale it must be 
researched further, tried on a pilot project and monitored very closely. 
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Two-way approach model 
This model examines the role that communication and education 
can play in the crusade against the spread of AIDS. It advocates the 
use of multiple but mutually reinforcing channels of communication 
that use mass media and interpersonal networks (Soola, 1991). 
The model posits that communication and educational efforts 
against the spread of AIDS should be community-based, encourage 
active support and involve the participation of local communities. To be 
effective, there has to be a team effort approach involving 
communicators, designers of instructional material, health personal 
and the public at large. 
One of the problems of communicating awareness and 
education about AIDS is that of communicating the meaning of the 
word AIDS itself accurately to people who are illiterate. But Soola 
suggests that there is no need to communicate technical information to 
each segment of the population because this is not realistic. There is 
need to de-mystify the disease and attack myths such as the one that 
says AIDS is an evil spirit that kills people who live in cities, and to be 
clear on how it is not transmitted. 
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The role of the Internet 
Although Africa has not benefited much at this point from the 
new communication technologies, including the Internet, the benefits 
of these technologies are coming slowly to the continent, taking into 
consideration the fact that nearly all the capital cities of African 
countries have an Internet connection, and there are benefits from 
such connections. Therefore the Internet is becoming a force to reckon 
with in any discussion of communication approaches in Africa. 
Some of the big beneficiaries of the Internet in Africa are 
universities. Researchers are collaborating internationally using the 
Internet, far more quickly and cheaply than they ever could before 
(Panos Briefing, April 1998, No. 28) . 
At present the Internet is being driven strongly by commercial 
forces and its sector in developing countries is becoming competitive. 
But perhaps it is too early to make conclusions about what is going to 
happen to Africa and the Internet. So far indications are that it is 
having a positive impact on areas like health in the rural areas of Africa 
as well. For instance, through HealthNet, a discussion forum for 
people in the medical profession and its associated mailing lists, users 
get access to a lot of people all over the world and discuss medical 
issues with them. For example: 
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• The Vanqa Hospital in Congo-Kinshasa use HealthNet to send 
regular dispatches to report on progress in treating trypanosomiasis 
to health organisations in the North, 
• burn surgeons in Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda use 
HealthNet to consult with one another on patient treatment and 
reconstructive surgery techniques, and 
• in the Gambia health workers no longer need to travel 700 
kilometres per week to collect data for a clinical trial because this 
information is now sent via email in seconds. 
These are just a few examples of the sort of uses that the Internet can 
and is being put to. There are many more areas in which it is being put 
to good use. In the context of this thesis this is important because if an 
appropriate model could be selected to promote interactivity in some 
Botswana television broadcasts to rural areas, the agency that is 
responsible for the programme can get communication about the 
outcome of any discussions quickly if e-mail is connected to the 
viewing centre. The TV station can also collect information from the 
Internet, and with technological convergence, can even onward relay 
video from the Internet. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has made a general tour of some communication 
models with a view to selecting an existing model or building one from 
some models that have been discussed that could be deemed 
appropriate for Botswana. 
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The conclusion reached is that many of the models discussed 
have aged somewhat in the light of the new communication 
technologies, including those of the Internet and communication 
satellites. Therefore any discussion of the communication models must 
necessarily make it clear whether or not the Internet could affect the 
communication impact of such a model, and how. It would be perilous 
to ignore the Internet in this and similar contexts. 
Regarding a suitable communication model that could be used 
by Botswana television, there are at least two, but both models can be 
effective only if the desired impact and outcomes have been 
researched and clarified first. One such model is the Development 
Support Communication, and before it can be used research must be 
done among the target population and ideally it should be used only 
where there is a need for a media blitz. But for regular television 
broadcasts, indigenous communication media, like Oramedia or 
Conversation, should be used, combined with mass media, with the 
support of facilities like Community Viewing Centres and electronic 
mail to promote interactivity and quick feedback. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA AND THE PLANS OF THE 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
Introduction 
This chapter gives a brief profile of Botswana and a short 
background of development since it attained independence. It touches 
on the institutions of government, style of development and the model 
of development. The new threats to development, HIV and AIDS, are 
also looked at in the context of how they impact on development plans. 
Finally the chapter focuses closely on the plans of the Ministry of 
Health, to see how the ministry wants to implement them and how the 
national TV service could be used to facilitate that implementation and 
improve the quality of delivery of services to rural communities. This is 
contrasted with what one official of the ministry said they would use 
the TV service for. 
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A BRIEF COUNTRY PROFILE 
At independence in 1966, Botswana was among the 25 poorest 
and least developed countries in the world (Vision 2016, Towards 
Prosperity for All , 1997). Very few people had jobs in the formal sector. 
Some wealth or income was derived from traditional agriculture, 
particularly cattle farming and the earnings of migrant labourers who 
were recruited by South African mines. The country had very little 
social and physical infrastructure. The population was largely illiterate 
and very few people were able to fill professional and technical 
positions, either in the public or private sector. Independence came 
during a drought year, 1966, and drought has continued to recur 
throughout the 33 years since then . As a result, provision of drought 
relief packages to the hardest hit groups of the population has been a 
feature of government expenditure over the years. Some people still 
depend on government relief schemes for their survival. There are 
monthly destitute rations and a small monthly old age pension. 
Independence saw the discovery and exploitation of diamonds at 
Orapa and Jwaneng, copper-nickel at Selebi-Phikwe, coal at 
Morupule, soda ash and salt at Sowa, and a number of minor mineral 
deposits in other parts of the country (Vision 2016, 1997) 
The local diamond parastatal company, Debswana, negotiated 
an agreement with the De Beers transnational mining conglomerate 
over exploitation of diamond deposits and obtained what was and still 
is considered to be favourable terms for Botswana. 
Concessions for the parastatal Botswana Meat Commission to 
export beef to the European Union led to an expansion of beef 
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production. There were also contributions from the international donor 
community. 
Therefore the revenues from all the above economic activities 
"helped Botswana to emerge from a situation of abject poverty, and 
then enter a period of rapid growth and economic transformation" 
(Vision 2016,1 997:15) . 
The government was and still is the principal recipient of 
diamond revenues. The revenues were largely invested to improve the 
physical, social and economic infrastructure of the country. These 
revenues are also said to have also been responsible for the 
improvement and delivery of government services to the population, 
and conditions of investment in productive activities and employment 
creation. "As a result of this economic growth, Botswana has 
graduated out of the group of the poorest and the least developed 
countries, and has now moved into the group of middle income 
countries, in the World Bank classification" (Vision 2016, 1997c:15). 
Government 
In the quest for better living conditions the government has, 
since independence, preached that its development philosophy was 
based on four national principles of self-rel iance, unity, development, 
and democracy. 
Development in Botswana is and has always been operated on 
the growth model of development, and since independence in 1966 to 
1996 the average growth in Gross Domestic Product (GOP) was nine 
percent, and it was regarded as being one of the highest in the world. 
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Although cattle farming was important during the early years, diamond 
mining gradually became the mainstay of the economy. Around 1994 
and 1995 minerals accounted for 34 percent of the GOP and 81 
percent of exports, while agriculture accounted for only four percent of 
GOP. 
The assumption on the part of government has always been that 
growth would necessarily create employment throughout the whole 
economy and generally improve the living conditions of the people. But 
problems like employment and poverty have persisted in Botswana. In 
1998, while the economy continued to record "an impressive growth 
rate", unemployment was at 21 percent, and the Annual Economic 
Report (1998: 17) which is produced by the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning concluded that "the youth and the uneducated 
continue to be the most affected. Given that unemployment continues 
to be a problem, strategies to minimize it have to be formulated". One 
strategy that the report recommended was to increase demand for 
labour through accelerated economic growth and "robust investment ". 
This recommendation goes back to emphasize the very growth which 
alone has not succeeded in solving the problem of unemployment. 
Another strategy that the report recommended was to slow down the 
rate of growth of the labour force by containing population growth. At 
the same time, the report admitted that population and development 
issues in Botswana are complex, arising primarily from the small but 
rapidly growing and sparsely distributed population, and rapidly 
transforming family and society, in combination with arid and fragile 
environments. In 1997 the population of Botswana was estimated at 
1.5 million people. 
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The problems of population and employment in Botswana were 
highlighted again in the budget speech presented by the Minister of 
Finance to parliament in 1998: "Alleviation of poverty and job creation 
remain the major challenges in our rural development efforts". 
Human Development 
There appears to be a new attempt on the part of the 
government in its approaches to development in Botswana, an attempt 
to re-define development and search for new indicators of 
development. Increasingly, the term "human development" appears 
frequently in the government's development lexicon, and for the first 
time since independence in 1966 Botswana produced its own Human 
Development Report in 1997, with the assistance of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), an agency of the United Nations, 
and the Botswana Institute of Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA), a 
private economic research institute. 
Previously, since 1990, Botswana used to be mentioned along 
with other countries in the annual global issues of the Human 
Development Report, which the UNDP has been producing since 
1990. The annual UNDP global report tracks the performance of each 
country in summary form according to a common set of statistical 
indicators of human development and composes national ran kings in 
relation to various composite indices of human development. The best 
known of these indices is the HDI, the human development index. The 
Botswana Human Development Report deals with Botswana in detail, 
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unlike in the global UNDP report. The general message of the reports 
is that "development is about people, not about things" (Botswana 
Human Development Report, 1997). 
In the foreword to the Botswana Human Development Report 
(BHDR, 1997), the representative of the UNDP in Botswana says the 
concepts and measurements of human development have evolved 
over time. For a long time, income per capita or GNP per capita was 
generally accepted as a measure of standard of living in a country, 
despite its shortcomings. For example, GNP per capita does not take 
into account distribution of income, but the human development index 
measures income per capita, educational attainment and life 
expectancy. 
After the introduction of annual UNDP human development 
reports or HDRs in 1990, there was potential for introducing HDRs 
within individual countries to examine the human development 
situations within each country in detail. The expectation was that 
national HDRs could adapt and localise the concept and measurement 
of sustainable human development to give prominence to those factors 
that are most important to the country concerned. The Botswana 
Human Development Report of 1997 was the first of its kind on the 
country. ''The purpose of such reports is to introduce fresh thinking 
and empirical research on human development in Botswana, and in so 
doing, promote public interest and debate" (BHDR, 1997:4). Each 
BHDR is expected to examine a major theme of human development 
in Botswana and conduct an annual monitoring of progress in relation 
to a set of "disaggregated national development indicators". 
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The theme of the 1997 BHDR is the challenges for sustainable 
human development in Botswana from a long-term perspective. The 
report talks about priorities, activities and targets that the government 
has established for the period 1997 to 2003 as contained in the 
National Development Plan No.8, and the longer term national aims 
that have been identified by Vision 2016: A Long Term Vision for 
Botswana. The report describes the paradigm of sustainable human 
development, and develops conceptual tools for interpreting human 
development in the specific setting of Botswana. But there is no 
reference to the role that communication media can play in this 
concept of development. 
One of the important contributions that Human Development 
Reports seem to have made to the development debate is that 
economic growth does not necessarily bring about progress in human 
development. In order for this to happen, the benefits of growth need 
to be widely shared among the population, particularly through the 
creation of jobs and through well-structured public expenditure on 
improved social infrastructure and services. 
Other critical factors required for sustainable human 
development, which have been discussed in detail in Chapter 3, 
include gender equality, popular participation in democracy and 
development activities and the respect and protection for people's 
rights and freedoms. 
It would appear that although economic growth generally 
remained high in Botswana through the 33 years of independence at 
an average of nine percent, alleviation of poverty has eluded the 
government. A study done by the Botswana Institute of Development 
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Policy Analysis, BIDPA, in 1997 revealed that "poverty alleviation 
remains one of the major challenges for human development in 
Botswana. Poverty is generally associated with the lack of education, 
skills and other human capabilities" (BHDR, 1997:23). 
Much of Botswana's poverty is structural. It is generally rooted in 
Botswana's narrow economic base and social disadvantages that are 
common among the poor. The poverty is concentrated in the rural 
areas and urban villages. 
The above conclusion about the problems of poverty alleviation 
is corroborated by the National Population Policy document (1997: 12) 
which says: "Despite the impressive growth in incomes resulting 
mainly from increases in mineral revenues, the persistence of poverty 
is a serious concern, especially in the face of high population growth 
rate". 
Rural poverty has driven a significant proportion of the rural poor 
to urban areas in search of non-existent job opportunities. In the case 
of those who end up getting some jobs, low wages often mean that 
they cannot escape from poverty, and "the task of bringing about 
improvements in their situation represents one of the major long term 
challenges for Botswana's development" (BHDR, 1997d: 10). 
While it is not easy to pinpoint a theory of development that 
explains Botswana's approach to development, the country is 
nevertheless one of those peripheral African countries who are almost 
permanently condemned to structural underdevelopment through their 
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subordinate role in the world capitalist system. This description of the 
country places it under the dependency theory of development. 
HIV and AIDS 
This chapter deals with development in Botswana generally, but 
it also focuses on the plans of the Ministry of Health, particularly as 
they affect the AIDS pandemic. This ministry has been selected 
among others because the government, in its past and present 
national development plans and its annual budgets has always 
attached high priority to health and treats it as a precondition for 
development. For example, under health, the present national 
development plan (1997-2003) says: 
The health of a country's citizens is one of the most important 
resources needed by a nation for the pursuit of national 
objectives. Health is important among the objectives and values 
of most individuals and they expect their governments to pursue 
policies that will afford them the opportunity to attain lives of 
optimum duration and quality (NDP 8:381) 
The Ministry of Health is responsible for the control and cure of 
many diseases in Botswana through its different programmes, but 
none of the diseases has reached the level of seriousness that the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic has, and that is why this disease has been 
singled out for discussion in this thesis, the assumption being that the 
ministry will take advantage of the new television service to fight its 
spread, because the Ministry says "HIV/AIDS has become a national 
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emergency and its control has to be accorded the highest priority" 
(NDP 8:381). 
This assumption is strengthened by what the Minister of Health 
at the time Chapson Butale said in 1998 at a consultative meeting for 
members of parliament on HIV/AIDS and Development held in 
Kasane, northern Botswana: 
The primary purpose of this meeting is to create an opportunity 
for us as Members of Parliament to examine the implications of 
HIV/AIDS on the socio-economic development of our country. 
And to further deliberate on what could be done to lessen the 
impact of HIV/AIDS at all levels of our society" (Report of 
Consultative Meeting on HIV/AIDS, Kasane, 1998:36). 
Further on the linkage between AIDS and development, when the 
Minister of Finance and Development presented the budget speech for 
the year 2000 he said, "the HIV/AIDS pandemic has emerged as a 
serious challenge to the economic development of the country" 
(Budget Speech, February 2000) . 
The first case of AIDS in Botswana was diagnosed in 1985. 
Since then the disease has spread dramatically. A study done in 1995 
estimated that about 23 percent of the population aged between 15 
and 49 were HIV positive, that is about 180 000 people, up from 59 
000 in 1992. It was also estimated that by the year 2000 some 332 
000 people would be HIV positive, despite the problem of under-
reporting. The highest rate of infection was recorded in the youth of 
ages 15 to 29 and in pregnant women. The disease is also growing 
among ch ildren aged 0 to 4 years. 
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The rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in Botswana is linked to a number 
of factors that include: 
(a) multiple sexual partners and frequent change of partners; 
(b) high rate of urbanisation, leading to the erosion of traditional 
safeguards for controlling sexual and social behaviour; 
(c) poverty and gender biases which often disadvantage and 
subordinate the poor and females in sexual and social relations. 
As a result: 
HIV/AIDS is now the most serious threat to human development 
in Botswana. It is generally appreciate that the pandemic will 
provide a major setback, not only in terms of people's health and 
survival, but also for the economy, the country and human 
resource base, the family and the country's children 
(BHDR,1997e:39) 
It is now expected that there is going to be a significant increase 
in infant mortality. The highest risk age group are young children aged 
five and younger, who are estimated to account for 25 to 35 percent of 
all AIDS victims. For some, it is due to transmission from infected 
mothers to their infants in the womb. 
Another fear is that higher adult deaths will deplete the labour 
force and cause many households to lose one or two of their family 
providers. In short, one of the most devastating effects of AIDS is the 
number of children being left without parental care. It was estimated 
that by the year 2000 there would be some 65 000 AIDS orphans in 
Botswana, and this would place additional stress on communities as 
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young adults die and young and old people are left without support 
and care (BHDR,1997) . 
While in several pronouncements the government sounds like it 
is ready to battle the spread of HIV, in the Population Policy document 
it seems to acquiesce because it says: "the goal to achieve adequate 
health care for all is likely to be made more difficult by the prevailing 
high fertility and the attendant young structure of the population 
coupled with the recent surge in the HIV/AIDS epidemic" (1997:14). 
This is in sharp contrast to the optimism expressed in Vision 2016 
(1997:9), which says by the year 2016 the spread of HIV will have 
been stopped, and there would be no new infections (if a cure would 
not have been found before then). 
The above paragraph shows that to a large extent policy makers 
in Botswana seem to be overwhelmed by the incidence of HIV/AIDS, 
and therefore unsure about what to do in order to stop its rapid spread 
and to cushion its devastating impact on the lives of the people and 
the economy. 
The pivotal government ministry is the Ministry of Health, and its 
development plans should be studied carefully with a view to finding 
out how the planners are going to try to use the new national TV 
service to fight health problems in the country, especially HIV/AIDS. 
The Plans of the Ministry of Health 
The Ministry of Health is charged with the responsibility of 
implementing health programmes throughout the whole of Botswana, 
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in collaboration with the Ministry of Local Government when it comes 
to programmers that are meant for the rural districts. 
The point of departure of the Ministry of Health on health 
programmes in the rural areas is the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978 
which was made at a conference in Russia that year at which the 
member countries of the World Health Organisation committed 
themselves to setting up development programmes to prevent ill-
health and attain productive health through primary health care 
strategies (NDP 8, 1997-2003). The declaration sees health as a 
human right and a necessity if all citizens are to lead an economically 
and socially productive life. Naturally, improvement in health care will, 
to a large extent, depend on inputs from other sectors like education, 
water, sanitation, the community and the traditional health system. 
The Ministry of Health is responsible for policy direction and for 
providing technical guidance. It also operates a network of 20 public 
hospitals around the country, and through its primary health care 
department collaborates with local authorities. It also runs a network of 
209 clinics, 314 health posts and 687 mobile stops. The number of 
some of these facilities increases every year. 
The strategy of the ministry emphasizes equity and intersectoral 
collaboration and community involvement in setting priorities for action, 
planning, organising and managing health care. 
The national health policy was developed and approved by 
government in 1995, and it defines the roles and responsibilities of 
various providers of primary health care services. 
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Pattern of ill-health 
According to the plans of the ministry (NDP 8, 1997-2003), the 
pattern of ill-health in Botswana shows a decline in the importance of 
childhood immunisable diseases and an increase in non-
communicable diseases. Infectious diseases remain the main causes 
of ill-health and death . Non-communicable diseases, which are 
associated with changes in life-style from an agricultural economy to a 
cash economy, are also becoming more serious. They are related 
mainly to a change in diet and to a more sedentary life. They are 
diseases such as hypertension, stroke, and diabetes. There is also an 
observation that the gap in health status between the rich and the poor 
is growing. 
Given the tasks that the ministry has to accomplish using both 
the financial and human resources at its disposal, it has an opportunity 
to make those tasks easier by using the new TV service to support 
their implementation. Some of the programmes that could be produced 
will be dealt with in the conclusion to this chapter. 
Interview with Director of Primary Health Care: 
Winnie Manyeneng 
In 1998 the author interviewed the Director of Primary Health 
Care, Winnie Manyeneng, to check the state of readiness of her 
ministry to use TV service in the implementation of health 
programmes. She made the following points: 
80 
• she was not sure if TV was coming because if it was, the 
Department of Information and Broadcasting would have briefed 
them about it so that they could prepare themselves to use it, but 
that department had not done that. 
• If TV was coming, then her ministry would not be ready with people 
who were trained in TV programme production . 
• If they were to train people in 1999 in programme production it 
could happen only as an emergency because they did not have 
anything in their plans about television and no budget. 
• She mentioned a short list of programme ideas that could be turned 
into TV programmes, but it was all hypothetical as there were no 
plans. 
The assumption here is that the Health Ministry itself should 
actually deliver the programming, as opposed to commissioning it for 
example, as it is done in some countries, like in South Africa where the 
Education Department pays the SABe to do the education 
programming . There seemed to be no sign that she had considered 
other possible ways, beyond direct delivery, to use TV in her strategic 
tasks. In other words, the Ministry does not seem to have thought of 
other ways of sourcing programmes, nor of the context in which health 
workers and community viewing centres could be harnessed to make 
for impact of programmes. 
Conclusion 
The plans of the Ministry of Health show that it has tasks and 
programmes that can be translated into TV programmes as well as a 
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development communication model potential, but the state of 
readiness, or rather the lack of it, casts a serious doubt on whether the 
ministry is going to be in a position to utilise the TV service to 
implement its health assignments. There appears to be a wide 
communication gap between officials of the ministry and those of the 
TV project implementation team at the Department of Information and 
Broadcasting, concerning the TV project and how any ministry should 
prepare for it if it wants to utilise its services. Also problematic is how 
communication about the TV project was handled by the Minister of 
Health who was a member of the cabinet that decided in March 1997 
that the country should have a national TV service. For almost two 
years after the decision was taken the ministry did not do anything to 
find out more about the TV service with a view to using it to support 
implementation of health plans. Similarly, there was no evidence that 
the department charged with the responsibility of implementing the TV 
project had at any time organised any briefing for the ministry on the 
TV service. 
An analysis of the plans of the ministry as laid out in the National 
Development Plan (1997-2003) shows that there is television 
programme material in those plans. For example: 
(a) the ministry has identified that a more sedentary life-style could 
lead to cardio-vascular diseases. A TV programme could be 
produced showing the type of physical exercises that people could 
do to improve their health and lessen the chances of getting such 
diseases. 
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(b) Village Health Committees or VHCs that have been set up 
throughout the country have organized various competitions in the 
past to promote good health and are well placed to make input into 
TV programmes so that such activities can be made into TV 
programmes. During the broadcast of such programmes some 
members of the committee could sit among the audience so that 
they can discuss the content of programmes at the end of the 
broadcast and generally help the audience to make sense of the 
broadcasts. 
(c) The health education unit of the ministry which collaborates with 
several NGOs to develop health-learning materials can 
demonstrate on TV how the materials should be used. 
(d) The safe childhood programme, which is promoted through 
schools, can be packaged into a series of TV programmes so that 
more schools can see it. The teachers at such schools would be 
better placed to discuss the programmes with the pupils at the end 
of the broadcasts. A similar approach could be used for materials 
that deal with immunisation. 
(e) The ministry admits that the level of contraceptive use has 
remained the same for the last decade, but "the causes of this 
levelling off are not known, but it is obvious that innovative ways of 
delivering family planning services have to be found in order to 
increase the levels of contraceptive usage" (NDP 8, 1997-
2003:391). 
This one requires a media blitz that includes intensive research 
that includes TV interviews and debates to find the cause. 
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(f) From time to time the ministry runs in-service courses to train 
Family Welfare Educators to mobilise communities to use modern 
health care systems and improve their well being through health 
education. The costs of this training and implementation could be 
cut by giving some of the training to members of already existing 
Village Health Committees who live among the communities, then 
producing TV programmes for reception by the communities and 
those members of the Village Health Committees who have been 
given some training. 
(g) Immunization coverage for BCG and measles dropped during 
1980s and the ministry has attributed this drop to problems of the 
long distances to vaccination sites, inadequate information and lack 
of motivation for mothers. TV could be used to step-up the flow of 
information and motivate mothers, again using Village Health 
Committees to promote interactivity. 
(h) The Ministry has trained AIDS counsellors, a voluntary counselling 
and testing centre, a home-based care programme and clinicians. 
Under information and communication the plan says "the challenge 
for NDP 8 is to intensify efforts to reduce risk taking attitudes" and 
this would be done through targeted messages based on audience 
analysis disseminated through "appropriate channels". One of the 
channels must now be television, to deliver all that is in the plan to 
a national audience. 
To a large extent, all that has been said above about the use of 
television shall depend on the level of preparedness and willingness of 
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the managers at the ministry to take advantage of the television 
service. 
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CHAPTER 6 
TELEVISION PLANS AS ROLLED OUT 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the plans of the television project as they 
unfolded. In particular, it examines and discusses the content of the 
correspondence that the Department of Information and Broadcasting 
wrote to the Office of the President and some ministries seeking 
guidance and clarification on how it should implement the TV project, 
and the content of a project memorandum that followed thereafter 
which describes the nature of the project. The process of setting up a 
team that was charged with the implementation of the project is also 
discussed. There is also the gist of an interview with the head of the 
implementation team who was recruited from the United Kingdom for 
the purpose. 
The aim of all this is to examine the participants' thinking of the 
project to find out more about its conceptualisation. This should help 
throw some light onto the central question of the thesis: that is, 
whether the service was conceptualised to contribute to rural 
development, particularly in the area of health and in the light of the 
battle against the AIDS disease. 
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The Three Scenarios 
Following the decision of the cabinet of March 1997 that 
Botswana should have its own television service, and that the project 
should be implemented by the government Department of Information 
and Broadcasting, the director of that department in response and 
apparently to clarify the nature of the assignment for himself and his 
department in general, wrote a letter to the permanent secretary to the 
President, under whose office the department falls, seeking guidance 
on how best to implement the project. The letter was also copied to the 
Director of Public Service Management who is responsible for 
allocating manpower to departments and ministries of government, 
and to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning whose ministry allocates funds for 
development projects as well as funds for the cost of running the 
projects once they have been completed. 
The letter put forward three different scenarios that the 
department could use to implement the TV project and sought the 
opinion and advice of those ministries (Letter: 9 April 97) 
The first scenario involved presenting a project memorandum to 
the funding ministry requesting funds to implement a project using its 
own manpower. The second was for government to engage 
consultants to implement the project and hand it to the department. 
The third and last scenario was that of setting up an implementation 
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unit "solely tasked with all aspects of the project". This is the scenario 
that was preferred by the department. The Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning and the Office of the President also preferred 
the same scenario, and it is the one that was finally approved by the 
government. No public justification was supplied as to why this was the 
preferred scenario. 
The responsibilities of the project implementation team were 
going to be to introduce a TV service within the Department of 
Information and Broadcasting. The project entailed: 
• building and developing a news and current affairs TV service that 
would be received countrywide; 
• identifying other sources of affordable programmes that could 
complement news and current affairs; 
• ensuring high quality standards for the service which should be set 
on a sound business plan and good operational concepts based on 
a sustainable vision; 
• monitoring the project's budget and cost control procedures; 
• informing government about problems that may cause 
unnecessary delays and cost escalations; 
• ensuring that the project is executed within budget and is on target, 
employing state of the art practices right from the inception of the 
project, and making sure that up to date satellite and computer 
technology "is extensively used". 
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There is no notion whatsoever in the project memorandum that other 
departments of government had an interest in the project and should 
have been involved. 
The implementation unit could use short-term consultants whenever 
necessary. Staff for the TV service would be recruited mainly from 
Botswana university graduates. 
The Co-ordinator Arrives 
A project co-ordinator, Kevin Hunt, was eventually recruited from 
the United Kingdom and arrived in Botswana to assume duties in 
October 1997. He had worked for the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, BBC. After being in post for a few weeks and after 
studying and making sense of the relevant documentation, including 
the cabinet decision that Botswana should have its own TV service, he 
interpreted the whole situation to himself and wrote to the director of 
Information and Broadcasting Ted Makgekgenene: 
The nub of all of this is that it was agreed that the nation should 
invest in a television service, notwithstanding its fiscal unviability, 
because it is perceived as bringing great benefit to the nation as 
a whole- a point of view with which I agree (Internal Memo 5 
March 1998). 
He noted that the cost of providing the initial service, including a news 
studio, and administration block, one Outside Broadcasting van , 
satellite communications equipment, some limited transmitters, had 
been estimated at 25 million Pula or 32 million Rand. As co-ordinator, 
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Hunt apparently perceived this as a rather too small a project at too 
high a cost, and said: 
It is very clear to me that, with a little more imagination and a 
somewhat increased expenditure, we can provide a much better 
long term infrastructure and initial service than has been 
envisaged. 
The increased expenditure would make it possible for the service 
to offer such programming as education, sport, discussion, music and 
drama, all produced "at relatively little extra cost". This meant that the 
project was changing in scope. The cost was now going to go up, from 
25 to 60 million Pula or 78 million Rand. The co-ordinator concluded: 
In short, I am confident that what I have in mind and the resultant 
recommendations are well matched to the country's requirement 
and expectations for this long awaited project. 
In line with what Hunt had in mind the Department of Information 
and Broadcasting submitted a project memorandum to the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning for 72 million Pula. The 
memorandum describes the project as "a practical TV structure that is 
not too big or complex but which will be cost-effective in the long term 
and capable of accommodating future growth in programming". It 
further says the TV station will be capable of broadcasting other 
programmes from other sources to complement the initial news and 
current affairs concept and will be run and developed commercially, 
"carrying adverts, promotions and leasing studio and technical facilities 
to the market". 
There is no explanation in the project memorandum as to why 
news and current affairs were deemed priorities as opposed to 
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education or documentaries for instance. No other programmes were 
mentioned specifically. 
Regarding signal transmission, the memorandum says the 
department was planning to lease space on the Pan American Satellite 
Seven (Pan AmSat 7). Justifying the choice and preference for satellite 
over traditional terrestrial methods of signal transmission the 
department says in the memorandum: 
• the entire country will be covered for both television and radio from 
day one, allowing direct reception to individual households 
throughout Botswana. Satellite receivers and antennae dishes are 
already available in the country for people to purchase. 
• Satellite signal distribution is more flexible when compared to other 
modes of distribution, eg: microwave and fibre optic. Besides, 
"satellites are the state of the art in the broadcasting industry and 
to this end the majority of broadcasters in the region as well as 
worldwide are either already using or planning to use satellite 
communications" (Project Memo,1998:2) 
On training, the project memorandum says training was critical 
and would have to run in parallel with the construction of the 
system and complex "if we are to meet the very tight deadline". 
Training would be given in news and current affairs production 
techniques, equipment operation and maintenance, lighting, sound 
and others. The same staff would be expected over time to gain 
experience such that they would be able to produce other 
programmes of attraction to the viewers. 
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There was no hint on whether the programmes that were 
expected to be produced should have any bearing on 
development. 
Expectations 
The expectations of the Office of the President and that of the 
Department of Information and Broadcasting, as outlined in the project 
memorandum, are that TV coverage of local events, depicting 
Botswana's cultural background with a selection of international 
events "will hopefully fertilise the ground for growth of cultural 
institutions in the country, and as a result TV could facilitate national 
integration and unity and stimulate economic activity through 
advertising and promotions". It was also their expectation that 
improved transmission coverage via satellite would make it easier for 
viewers throughout the country to access good quality signals and as a 
result benefit from "valuable information" on national events and 
aspects related to the implementation of government policies and 
programmes carried over Botswana television and Radio Botswana. 
The idea was that radio would also be accessible through satellite but 
its existing terrestrial transmission infrastructure would continue as 
usual. 
The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning agreed to 
the request to fund the project and gave the department 72 million 
Pula. This figure did not include the cost of training, and a few months 
later the department came back and requested funds for training a 
staff of 80 to 100 people. It was given 8 million Pula as requested. 
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Training would comprise a mixture of local foundation and 
assessment courses, spread over some four months in 1998, with a 
key overseas course lasting six months for 20 trainees, two or more 
from each key discipline, covering journal ism, technical operations, 
editing, production, engineering, lighting, camera work, sound mixing, 
graphic design, library and media management. Additional training for 
the remaining recruits would take place in southern Africa. 
Interview: Project Co-ordinator-Kevin Hunt 
Kevin Hunt was asked to describe the kind of television service 
that he thought Botswana was going to have, and he said he hoped 
the country would get: 
a very comprehensive television service, one that informs, 
educates and entertains. There will be only one channel. So I 
hope we'll provide a real mix of programming. It will be very 
much news-based to begin with, which is the brief which we 
have. There'll be a high education content. But it must be 
entertaining to attract the audience. 
He said he had difficulty answering the question of who was going to 
watch Botswana television as he had been in the country for only six 
months. But he said he hoped anybody who had a satellite dish would 
be able to watch it as it would be direct-to-home, off the satellite. If one 
was in Gaborone city in the south or Francistown city in the north of 
the country, then it would be terrestrially transmitted on ordinary aerial 
as well, and they were looking into ways of re-transmitting from the 
satellite into large areas with a thousand people or more, perhaps 
using solar energy. He was not sure how people in those areas would 
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view the programmes though, saying perhaps some would use a car-
battery for their power: 
I think people will look for a way to watch television. But if we can 
provide a central point, perhaps in some communities, in the 
village hall or 'kgotla' or whatever, where people can watch 
television, perhaps that's an answer as well. There's lots of work 
to do on that one. 
A 'kgotla' is a traditional meeting place in a village where issues of 
importance to the community, except party politics, are discussed, and 
anybody has a right to contribute to the discussion. 
Hunt was not sure whether Botswana TV was the kind of service 
that could be used for rural development, but he said he hoped it 
could: 
I would very much hope so. Obviously that is a major part of 
Botswana culture and way of life. One of the things that 
television is going to do is to change this radically. It has done 
that everywhere in the world and it's bound to do it here, 
especially if it is indigenous television, and not imported 
American television, nor South African television, nor British 
television, or whatever it is. 
Initially, Botswana TV would be scheduled to broadcast for five 
hours each day, with additional hours of broadcast at weekends to 
accommodate sporting events. 
Some people in Botswana have watched South African television 
for many years, both SABe and M-NET, and when BTV goes on air it 
would find nearly all these people still watching these channels. It 
would have to compete with those channels for the local national 
audience. It shall therefore to a large extent depend on the 
attractiveness of its programmes. 
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When asked to comment on how attractive he thought BTV 
programmes were going to be Hunt said: 
Let's get th is clear. We the team are not here to make 
programmes. We are here to facilitate Batswana making 
programmes. So what we will do is to help and encourage that 
they are made as professionally as possible, technically 
speaking, but how they wi ll actually produce the programmes, 
how they write them, will be very much down to the local 
workforce. So at the end of the day the quality of programming 
will come from that process, and we will do everything we can. 
And I don't see why BTV should not be as good as any other TV 
in the world , as opposed to as bad as any other TV in the world. 
On training, Hunt said his office had advertised widely 
throughout Botswana. They sent out 5 000 application forms and 2 
000 people applied. They interviewed the applicants and everyone that 
they selected went through a four-week aptitude course. They wanted 
to end up with 80 to 100 people out of the 2 000. They expected one 
or two people to drop out. "We hope we have chosen the right people 
because we don't have time to lose people". The plan was that after 
the aptitude course trainees would go on a variety of other courses. 
Some would go on "a very expensive and intensive course, about 10 
or 20 people, almost certainly in the UK". The others would be trained 
somewhere in the SA DC region. Hunt's office formulated the courses 
and advertised for quotations to meet their specifications. The 
advertisements for prospective trainees said one should have a 
diploma, and it did not matter in which discipline, and he explained: 
.. . unless you happen to want to be an engineer, then you need a 
technical background. But for any other job in television we are 
really looking for people who want to do it, with a creative input. 
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We hope they can take tuition and learn. We are looking for the 
very best people that Botswana can provide. 
Conclusion 
A careful study of the written communication that went back and 
forth between the director of the Department of Information and 
Broadcasting and the project co-ordinator suggests that the co-
ordinator influenced the director to change the scope of the TV project 
and make it bigger than it was originally conceived and as was 
presented to the cabinet. It is difficult to say whether this was a good 
or a bad thing. What one can say is that the project definitely changed 
scope and its estimated total cost increased from 25 to 80 million Pula, 
an increase of 55 million Pula, which is almost three times the original 
figure. As a result, the TV station, at least the building, was obviously 
going to be a lot bigger than the news and current affairs outfit that it 
was originally meant to be. The manpower figures, 80 to 100 people, 
do also tell a story of a bigger project. About programme output, one 
should expect the same, that it should no longer be just news and 
current affairs. 
But there is a real danger that this increased capacity is going to 
remain idle because the TV project co-ordinator has admitted that he 
and his implementation team had neither involved nor briefed other 
ministries and departments, nor the private sector in the TV project 
and how they were expected to fit in it so that they could prepare 
themselves for participation in programme production, or provision via 
96 
commissioned or sponsored material, or creative interventions in 
community viewing contexts. 
Technically, and according to the broadcasting engineer of the 
department, Habuji Sosome, in an interview with the author, the station 
as conceived has technical capacity to broadcast 24 hours a day 
(Interview, 16th May 2000). 
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CHAPTER 7 
ASSESSMENT OF THE TV PROJECT 
Unlike governments in many independent African countries, the 
government of Botswana took many years, about 31 , after 
independence from Britain in 1966, before it introduced a television 
service. There are not many reasons why this was so, except the one 
main reason that runs through the letters of official correspondence 
about a TV service for the country, which was that if it were to be 
introduced, only a few people would have had the financial capacity to 
afford a TV set and the majority in the rural areas would not be able to 
watch it at all as the rural areas had not yet been electrified. 
BeSides, in the light of the scanty resources that were available 
television was seen as a luxury, which the economy could not afford. 
But radio broadcasting was perceived as an important tool for 
development, and this perception was reinforced by the conclusions of 
the Hughes Report of 1968, which is discussed in Chapter 2. 
But 31 years after independence, in 1997, the government 
decided on the introduction of television in Botswana. Although the 
reasons for not introducing it seemed strong, the reasons for 
introducing it did not seem equally strong. 
It is not clear whether the government wanted Botswana to have 
a television service simply because it had become one of the only few 
countries remaining in Africa that did not have one, or whether 
because TV would help create Botswana's own heroes and heroines, 
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or any number of additional reasons. Since the liberation of South 
Africa in 1994 black South Africans who appeared on South African 
television which is viewed widely in Botswana had become household 
names and had in some sense become heroes and heroines of many 
people in Botswana. Such South Africans were often invited to 
Botswana, especially to the capital city Gaborone to launch or to 
officiate at national events. Another possibility is that the government 
wanted its ministers and senior officials to be seen on the TV screen 
because they were generally not known very much and instead it was 
the South African ones that were known better in Botswana. The last 
possibility is that perhaps the government thought television would 
create some employment and assist development by exhortation as 
people in one part of the country saw others on television applauded 
for their achievements in their rural development projects, they would 
envy them and work hard at their own projects so that they too could 
be applauded on television one day, and in this way contribute to rural 
development. 
One has to say this because as the television project was 
nearing completion as regards the TV building, the reason for having a 
television service seemed to move away farther and farther into the 
distance. This is the point at which one was expecting to see at least a 
blueprint for a programme schedule. But there were none except 
rough ideas from the project co-ordinator, ideas that some 
programmes would be produced locally and others imported. He had 
no idea regarding the percentages of foreign as opposed to locally 
produced programmes. 
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When the decision was made by the Botswana cabinet in 1997 
to have a TV service, it was simply said that the project would be 
implemented by the Department of Information and Broadcasting, 
without any stipulation regarding how this was going to be done, and 
there is no evidence to show that the decision-makers themselves 
understood the implications of what they were saying. But after 
several scenarios were suggested by the director of Information and 
Broadcasting regarding what he thought would be the appropriate 
implementation scenario, which was an implementation unit set up 
within his department, there was a problem of how to recruit the right 
staff for the task of implementation. This problem seems to have 
arisen because no one was sure what the different tasks for 
implementing such a project were. As a result everything was left to 
the project co-ordinator Kevin Hunt of the UK. Many of the problems 
that plagued the project later were blamed on him. 
From the various criticisms made, it would appear that the main 
source of Hunt's problems was that he was not qualified for a project 
of that magnitude. He also admitted in the interview, which is 
discussed in Chapter 5 that he had never implemented a project of 
that type before. Besides, the Director of Information and 
Broadcasting, Ted Makgekgenene (Interview: 29 May 2000) admitted 
that Hunt was the wrong person for the project and he 
(Makgekgenene) had made this clear in a meeting with the panel that 
considered applications for that job and that his own objections were 
on record in the form of minutes of that meeting. Nonetheless, he was 
overruled by the Department of Public Service Management, the 
government's employment agency. 
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It was now up to the team leader to recruit the rest of the team. 
He did. But another team, the TV Reference Group of permanent 
secretaries that had been meeting for some four years in the Office of 
the President to discuss the politics and economics for and against the 
introduction of a TV service was no longer there. It had quietly either 
disbanded or fallen into abeyance without explanation or 
announcement for no apparent reason. This is the team that should 
have guided Hunt through the process of implementing the project and 
served as a support for his team. 
One of the recommendations that the ITU consultants made in 
the report of their feasibility study on the introduction of a TV service in 
Botswana was that, if the government decided to a establish a 
television service, one of its most important and urgent tasks would be 
to lay down strong and clear policy guidelines, because without such 
policy the development of the service would be hampered and the 
service would be unable to function as it should (p.295). This was not 
done. 
Another document that would perhaps have helped Hunt is 
Vision 2016: Towards Prosperity for All, a document that contains a 
summary of the aspirations of the people of Botswana and would give 
anyone charged with the responsibility of implementing such and 
similar projects in Botswana, a rough idea of the direction the nation 
said it wanted to take. During one interview with the author 
(July 1998), Hunt said he had not been made aware of Vision 2016; he 
had not been briefed on the role that the TV service was meant to fulfil. 
He said he hoped Botswana TV could contribute to rural development, 
but the role of the media in development had not featured in any of the 
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discussions that he had had with government officials on the TV 
seNice that he had been recruited to set up. 
One of the first steps that Hunt took when he arrived was to 
change the scope of the project. 
The director of the Department of Information and Broadcasting 
would not explain why the scope of the project had been changed 
(InteNiew: July 1998). As a result the writer sent nine written questions 
to the Office of the President, including this one question, and the 
answer was: 
With the arrival of the project team it became clear that the 
estimates provided earlier as well as facilities were too modest. 
More realistic estimates and detailed assessment of 
infrastructure were done through experienced staff in the team 
(June 25, 1999). 
It is difficult to say what this meant. At best it could mean that 
permanent secretaries at the Office of the President and the director of 
Information and Broadcasting agreed to the change in the scope of the 
project because they assumed that "experienced staff in the team" 
knew what they were talking about and they had put all their faith in 
the team. At worst it could mean that "the original estimates" were not 
based on any criterion for calculating the cost of the project. There is 
no evidence of any debate having taken place on the wisdom or 
otherwise of changing the scope of the project. 
This change in the scope of the project emerged as one of the 
sources of the problems of the project, because it meant the project 
took longer to implement than anticipated. Neither the project 
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implementers nor officials of the Office of the President fully 
understood the full import and ramifications of the change, both in 
financial and manpower terms. It meant that the total estimated cost of 
the project was going to go up and more people recruited for the 
running of the whole station. 
The execution of the project had several problems including a 
labour strike at the construction site, which is not relevant to be 
discussed here. But the one problem that seem to have weakened the 
team was the departure of the senior project producer, a certain David 
Millard, who had also come from the UK and who left after four months 
in Botswana and returned to the UK, allegedly because of bitter 
disagreement with the project co-ordinator Hunt on the manner in 
which the TV project should be implemented. Millard was also said to 
have written a damning report to Botswana's Vice President Ian 
Khama raising serious doubts about Hunt's qualifications to head the 
TV project (The Botswana Guardian, 3 December 1999, p.1) This and 
other allegations and rumour caused concern among the people of 
Botswana generally and the private media, leading one journalist to 
comment in the same issue of the newspaper: 
The myth that all is well at Botswana's multi-million Pula 
television may have been sustained on lies, lack of transparency 
and non-disclosure of true facts by senior government officials 
behind the project (p.1). 
Later in March 2 000 after the TV service had failed to meet 
another commencing date, another Botswana weekly newspaper 
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commented: "Botswana TV will be a huge, wasteful and embarrassing 
project" (Mmegi Monitor, Vol.1 No.2, 7-13 March 2000, p.25). 
There had been too much silence about what was going on with 
the TV project. Even when the budget meeting of parliament was on in 
February to April 2 000 very little was said about the project, except 
that some MPs complained that the expenditure on the TV project 
should not have been lumped together with that of the whole 
Department of Information and Broadcasting because they could not 
see what the TV project was costing, and one MP complained about 
what he called the recruitment of an expatriate co-ordinator for 
Botswana TV who had no experience for the job (Botswana Daily 
News, February 29, p.3). As the author of this study sat through the 
debate in parliament, he did not get the impression that MPs knew 
anything about the TV project because the few comments that were 
made amounted to anxiety about what the project was really about and 
when the station would go on air. 
Hunt is dismissed 
One surprising development that happened at the TV project 
was the dismissal of the project co-ordinator himself. The dismissal 
became front-page news in the local news media, including one article 
headlined: "Hunt sacked-but the future of Botswana TV continues to 
be shrouded in mystery" (The Botswana Gazette, Wednesday 29 
March 2 000, p.1). 
No one in government was ready to explain why the co-ordinator 
had been sacked. The director of Information and Broadcasting said 
104 
very little too (Interview, 2nd June 2 000). He said there had been 
complaints about Hunt's management of the TV implementation 
programme from the people that Hunt worked with and the dismissal 
was also connected with the contents of an audit report on the project 
that had been done by an accounting firm, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
which had blamed Hunt for cost-overruns and general 
mismanagement of the project. He also said although the TV building 
was about to be completed there was no one to run the TV service as 
Hunt had not put any management structure in place. He said it had 
emerged that all the time Hunt had concentrated on the TV building, 
eqUipment and furniture, and had paid very little attention to the TV 
service itself. 
As a result the Government of Botswana had decided to appeal 
to the management of the British Broadcasting Corporation in the UK 
to come quickly and rescue the project and "put it on track". 
There were also problems with training. Some 65 people spent 
some four months at the Broadcast Centre of BOP TV in Mafikeng, 
South Africa, supposedly training for BTV, but no actual training took 
place. According to their trainer, Rob Gray, who had been recruited 
from South Africa for the purpose, it became impossible for him to train 
65 people virtually alone in different TV skills and without facilities 
(Interview, 22 May 2 000). He said the BOP TV facility that had been 
rented for use by Botswana television trainees had no suitable 
equipment for the purpose. The trainees themselves say they spent 
most of their four months there idling, and they even wrote a letter of 
complaint to the director of the department back home in Botswana 
about what was happening to them. In one of their jointly signed letters 
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the trainees say they wanted to make him aware that "the training 
programme has been wrought with a lot of problems since it started". 
They also made the following points: 
• the office of the TV project co-ordinator in Botswana did not 
do its homework regarding how the television crew should be 
trained, they employed a trainer with the expectation that he 
would do everything 
• the mass hiring of people without taking into consideration 
their specific training needs created a problem of how to 
proceed with the training 
• because of lack of a clear course outline it has been difficult 
to accommodate new trainees immediately into the training 
programme 
After the trainees had returned to Botswana from Mafikeng in 
South Africa, they wrote a letter to their trainer this time, Rob Gray, 
who had now been designated Senior Project Producer about their 
impressions regarding his performance (Letter: 27 February 2 000) , 
and they made the following observations: 
• since we have had you as our trainer in Mafikeng and now as 
senior project producer, there is no single locally produced 
programme ready for broadcast when the station goes on air 
• because of the confusion that is currently brewing in the 
production section we do not know where we stand; we are 
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appealing to you to resolve the situation as soon as possible so 
that we can get on with our work 
• trainees in the graphic section had been promised that they 
would go for attachments in South Africa to work with a 
company there but th ings have been quiet regarding that issue 
• there has been insufficient training of editors in areas such as 
basic theories and principles of editing. 
According to the trainees, none of the letters were repl ied to in 
writing. There was only general and vague talk in some management 
meetings about some of the issues that they had raised and the 
questions that they had asked. 
What is difficult to fathom is how in the first place the trainees 
were transported to South Africa for this training without a thorough 
assessment of the training facilities having been done first, as well as 
who was going to do the training and how. As the situation stands at 
BTV the staff have not been properly trained. The senior producer Rob 
Gray said "we take 20 hours to edit a 15-minute programme". 
Some two weeks after Kevin Hunt had been ejected from his job 
the writer interviewed him on the telephone on the eve of his departure 
for the UK about why he had been dismissed from the TV project (4th 
May 2 000). According to Hunt, his implementation team had created 
"a fantastic TV station. And as far as we know we got it right". He 
explained that one of the problems that he had had when he arrived in 
Botswana to start his assignment was that for at least six months 
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nobody in government really supported the TV project, including the 
minister in the Office of the President who was responsible for the 
media, Ponatshego Kedikilwe, and he could not understand why that 
was. His team tried to implement the project with very little help and a 
lot of delays, "I would spent hours just trying to get a driver". Another 
problem was that he had heard of "a thing" called the TV Reference 
Group and that his team was going to be having regular meetings with 
to help and guide his team in the implementation of the project, "but 
we never had a single meeting with the TV Reference Group". 
It is not clear why Hunt was dismissed from the project. He said 
he did not get any explanation apart from the allegations that were 
made in the audit report done by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, which he 
said, was "completely fabricated". He said he was not called to any 
meeting to be told that he would have to go, even by his overall 
supervisor, the director of Information and Broadcasting Ted 
Makgekgenene: "Ted did not speak to me. He just gave me an 
envelope with a letter in it. There is no reason for pinning me to the 
wall and then getting the BBC to do what I have already done. You 
see, the problem is that there is no problem". 
In May 2 000 Hunt presented part of his case in a short letter that 
was published in a Botswana weekly newspaper (Mmegi Monitor, 
16-22 May, p.13). In the letter Hunt says after he had written to the 
Office of the President repudiating what he called "extremely serious 
allegations" against him that had been made in the audit report, "the 
Botswana Government, for reasons best known to itself decided to 
completely ignore my response, choosing instead, without any kind of 
dialogue or hearing, to arbitrarily terminate my contract". 
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Following his departure, or because of his departure rather, the 
Botswana television service project was back at the beginning. This 
fact is also demonstrated by the nature of the terms of reference that 
the Government of Botswana has given to the leader of the BBG team, 
Simon Higman, who has now been officially designated Acting General 
Manager of BTV. He was assigned "to undertake a wide-ranging 
review of BTV in terms of its strategy, finance, programming and 
operations". 
Some of the details listed under this broad mandate are: 
• the legislative and regulatory framework for broadcasting (including 
employment issues) 
• exploration of new channel vision and editorial policy 
• hours of broadcasting 
• management roles and responsibilities 
• expectations of income from all sources, start-up funding and 
opportunities for generating further sources of income 
• BTV's cost-base and running costs 
• operating business plan to deliver its editorial policy strategy 
• proposed mix of locally produced and imported programmes 
• possible alliances with other broadcasters to share news material 
• recruitment and training needs of editorial and operational staff 
• capacity of broadcasting plant, and 
• long term support in terms of both local staffing and from the BBG. 
Nearly all of these are things that should have been done long before 
the project was started in 1998, even before Hunt was recruited. It is 
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therefore difficult to believe that they were all precipitated by his 
departure when he had at least two immediate supervisors, the 
director of Information and Broadcasting and the permanent secretary 
in the Office of the President who is responsible for administration. 
An interview with Higman by a local newspaper does underline the 
fact that Kevin Hunt concentrated only on the building and the 
equipment: 
Hunt built a lot of technology without considering what he was 
going to do with it. And at times he brought in some of the 
technology which he does not even need. Our conclusion is that 
he was technology-driven, while my programme is editorially 
driven. All our work should depend on output and looking at 
history. Hunt's programme has not taken off. Yes, of course he 
came up with a building which I think is probably over specified. 
It is a nice building though, and everyone will die for it. 
(MmegifThe Reporter, 9-15 June 2000, p.6) 
110 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion of this thesis is that Botswana has missed a 
great opportunity to have a television service that could be used to 
contribute to rural development, particularly in the area of health, a 
service that could have been used to battle the AIDS disease, among 
other things. Perhaps greater opportunities might have been there had 
resources gone into radio, school programmes, or other strategies to 
promote health development. However, inasmuch as a decision was 
made to spend money on TV, this represented a resource that could 
have been utilized. 
Further research could be done in order to establish the actual 
situation. 
The opportunity for Botswana to have an appropriate TV service 
was there because in the first place, the country decided to introduce a 
television service at a time when there already existed in the region 
already a lot of expertise in the setting up and running of a TV service 
and within the CBA, the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association of 
which Botswana is a member. 
Those in government who had an idea of what a television 
service was about do not seem to have advised appropriately, and did 
not open up the debate and allow advice from those in the region who 
had run television stations to make a contribution. Advice was not 
sought from universities in the region who could also have contributed 
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to the debate and the conceptualisation of an ideal TV service for 
Botswana given its dilemma of high economic growth and serious 
problems of poverty. The argument here is that if advice had been 
actively sought, the present abyss into which the project has fallen 
could have been sidestepped. As a result the nation has lost money 
with nothing to show for it, and it is going to continue to lose money on 
this project but it is not aware. It is not aware because members of 
parliament, including those in the opposition, have not actively sought 
information on the TV project before it was started with a view to 
monitoring its implementation programme and problems. 
The Ministry of Health, which is one of the ministries that could 
have benefited immensely and immediately from a TV service has 
missed a great opportunity because as the new Minister of Health Joy 
Phumaphi explained, management at the Department of Information 
and Broadcasting had made it very clear that they would not be in a 
position to assist her ministry regarding programme production for 
television (Interview, 12 May 2000). She said she had hoped that 
management at that department would brief them on the TV project 
and generally guide them on how they should fit into the planning of 
the service but this did not happen. In the absence of this assistance 
her ministry had decided to engage a private video-production 
company to do a documentary and advertisements on health problems 
in Botswana, and some of her ministry staff were working with the 
company with the hope that they would pick up some production skills 
and continue to produce similar television products for her ministry. 
The Educational Broadcasting Unit of the Ministry of Education had 
also sought similar assistance and they also got a similar 
112 
response.The project-co-ordinator had admitted that his team and the 
management of the department of Information and Broadcasting had 
not assisted any government ministry to prepare itself for the expected 
television service (Interview: July 1998). 
The private sector, according to one senior producer at the TV station 
was "pestering" them everyday with questions about the cost of 
producing promotional material and advertisements for their 
businesses but they had no answers. 
It has also become clear that even the overall supervisor of the 
TV project, the Director of Information and Broadcasting Ted 
Makgekgenene had all the time not known what was involved in the 
TV programme sales market. In an article he wrote for the 
government-owned Botswana Daily News he confessed: 
It was not until I went to Sithenge- the Film TV programmes 
market in Cape Town, South Africa early this year that I learnt a 
bit more about television programme acquisition . This buying 
and selling of television programmes is a big business and 
Sitenge was an eye opener for me. 
(Botswana Daily News, Feb.23, 2000 NO.36 p.4) 
One would have expected this and similar articles in a national 
newspaper from someone in his position to have appeared during the 
debates on whether or not Botswana should have a national TV 
service and not a few months before the station was scheduled to go 
on air. It would be a completely different matter if he were not in a 
position to make final decisions on such matters as programme 
acquisition. 
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In the circumstances, one of the best options would be for public 
broadcasting in Botswana would be to break out of the political 
enclave and administrative strait-jacket of a civil service department, 
and become a parastatal at least, so that it can make business 
decisions with the urgency that business normally requires, and 
employ people because of their talent and not because of political 
considerations which is normally the case when it comes to high 
positions in government. Government civil service regulations will 
suffocate Botswana television, assuming that it can be resurrected. 
The Botswana television service is stillborn. There has been an 
incredible lack of professional and intellectual capacity to 
conceptualise any television service at all , let alone a television service 
suitable for Botswana. What started in 1997 as a television service 
project ended up in 2000 only as a nice build ing, and what should 
have been a team of trained programme producers became good 
people still waiting to be trained. 
Therefore the present TV station, or TV building rather, can be 
used only as a national video-cassette-player, whereby management 
can obtain videocassettes on any subject from any part of the world 
and play it for the nation, until such time that a real TV service for 
Botswana has been conceptualised and put in place. 
The arrival in Botswana in May 2000 of the team from the British 
Broadcasting Corporation in London to rescue the television project 
should be seen as marking the beginning in earnest of the TV service 
project, now that the building has been completed and now that 
someone has remembered a television service. This assumes that the 
BBC team has capacity to do that. 
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The story of what happened or not happened to or about the 
project to set up a national television service for Botswana needs to be 
dug out, perhaps by a presidenhal commission of enquiry in order to 
find out what happened to the taxpayers' money, and why at the end 
of it all there was only a building full of equipment and many people on 
the payroll who were not being used, and no television service. 
In this thesis I have looked at theories of development and 
models of media in development, the manner in which Botswana TV 
was conceptualised, and at the same time at Botswana's development 
needs and health situation. In measuring the development of 
Botswana against these possibilities, needs and potentials, I have 
observed that there was a regrettable shortfall. I have therefore 
concluded that to the extent that the Government of Botswana had 
assumptions that if Botswana were to have its own television service 
the service could contribute to development, the assumptions were not 
public and certainly not evident in the execution of the television 
project. 
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Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning 
Permanent Secretary to the President 
28 April 1989. 
Botswana cannot afford a TV service. 
FOP 80/4/47 1 (35) 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
Permanent Secretary to the President 
1 6 June 1989 
Use of Satellite transmissions for BTV 
IBS 1/5A 11 (5) 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
Permanent Secretary to the President 
8th December 1989. 
Visit by M-NET 
IBS 1/5A 11 (16) 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
Permanent Secretary to the President 
6th August 1990 
The Role of TV in Botswana 
IBS 1/5a 11 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
Permanent Secretary to the President 
27 August 1990 
Feasibility study for introduction of TV 
IBS 1/5A 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
Permanent Secretary to the President 
15 April 1992 
Feasibility Report by Gordon Croton of BBC TV 
IBS 1/5A 11 (85) 
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Permanent Secretary to the President 
Permanent Secretary, Finance and Development 
28 June 1994 
Feasibility Study for BTV by Studio Hamburg 
OP 24/12 1 V (36) 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
Permanent Secretary to the President 
9th November 1994 
Report of Feasibility Study for BTV 
IBS 1/5A 111(81) 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
Permanent Secretary, Finance and Dvelopment 
19 June 1996 
Draft Cabinet Memorandum on BTV 
IBS/1/5A 1V (5) 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
Permanent Secretary to the President 
9th April 1997 
Implementation of BTV Service Project 
IBS 1/5A 1V (58) 
Permanent Secretary, Finance and Development 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
1 yth April 1997 
Implementation of BTV Service Project 
FOP 28/2/2 V11 (97) CE (P) 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
Administrative Secretary, Office of the President 
22 May 1997 
Implementation of BTV Service Project 
None 
Tv. Project Co-ordinator (Internal Memo) 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
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Ref. No. 
5 March 1998 
Budget for BTV Project 
None 
Director, Architectural and Building Services 
Director, Information and Broadcasting 
17 March 1998 
Building for Botswana Television 
DIB/GAB/11 V(1) PA 2 
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